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ADAM COX*
Courts and scholars have operated on the implicit assumption that the Supreme
Court’s “one person, one vote” jurisprudence put redistricting politics on a fixed,
ten-year cycle. Recent redistricting controversies in Colorado, Texas, and elsewhere, however, have undermined this assumption, highlighting the fact that most
states are currently free to redraw election districts as often as they like. This essay
explores whether partisan fairness—a normative commitment that both scholars
and the Supreme Court have identified as a central concern of districting arrangements—would be promoted by a procedural rule limiting the frequency of redistricting. While the literature has not considered this question, scholars generally are
pessimistic about the capacity of procedural redistricting regulations to curb partisan gerrymandering. In contrast, this essay argues that a procedural rule limiting
the frequency of redistricting will promote partisan fairness by introducing beneficial uncertainty in the redistricting process and by regularizing the redistricting
agenda.

Last spring brought a sudden shock to the ritual of redistricting
politics. Breaking the routine of decennial redistricting, Colorado
decided to redraw its congressional districts less than fifteen months
* Copyright  2004 by Adam Cox. Assistant Professor of Law, The University of
Chicago Law School. B.S.E., 1996, Princeton University; J.D., 1999, University of
Michigan Law School. I would like to thank Ahilan Arulanantham, Gary Cox, Elizabeth
Garrett, Sam Hirsch, Jenia Iontcheva, Michelle Kim, Christopher Meade, Elizabeth
Milnikel, Jide Nzelibe, Nathanial Persily, Frederick Vars, and the participants in the faculty
workshop at the University of Chicago Law School for extremely helpful comments and
suggestions. The paper also benefited greatly from comments made during presentations
at Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, the University of Iowa College of Law, Loyola
University of Chicago School of Law, the University of Michigan Law School, the
University of Minnesota Law School, Vanderbilt University Law School, Wake Forest
University School of Law, and William & Mary School of Law.
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after its post-2000 census congressional districting scheme went into
effect.1 Simultaneously, Texas Republicans introduced legislation to
redraw their newly minted congressional districts. Democratic legislators fled Texas twice in an attempt to block passage of the redistricting
legislation, but eventually they were forced to return.2 When they did,
the Republican majority pushed through its redistricting bill.3 These
events may have opened the floodgates: New Mexico and Oklahoma
Democrats initially threatened to retaliate against the actions in Texas
by revising their districts to favor Democrats,4 Georgia Republicans
are considering changes to that state’s congressional districts,5 and
there are reports that other states may mount the re-redistricting
bandwagon as well.6
These events have undermined the assumption, common in
voting rights jurisprudence and scholarship, that redistricting occurs
1 Compare Avalos v. Davidson, No. 01 CV 2897, 2002 WL 1895406, at *1 (D. Colo.
Jan. 25, 2002) (establishing districts based on 2000 census) with Act of May 9, 2003, ch. 247,
2003 Colo. Sess. Laws 352 (revising districts established in Avalos). See also T.R. Reid,
G.O.P. Redistricting: New Boundaries of Politics?, WASH. POST, July 2, 2003, at A4;
Michael Riley, Dems Blast Plan to Alter Congressional District Lines, DENVER POST, May
5, 2003, at 6B.
2 More than fifty Democratic members of the Texas House of Representatives fled to
Oklahoma for the final few days of the spring legislative session. See David Barboza &
Carl Hulse, Texas’ Republicans Fume; Democrats Remain AWOL, N.Y. TIMES, May 14,
2003, at A17. When the Governor called a special session, eleven of the twelve Democrats
in the State Senate then fled to New Mexico to deprive that chamber of a quorum. See
Democrats On The Run, Again, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2003, at A18. Six weeks later, after
one of the senators returned to Texas and deprived the remaining ten of their quorumbusting power, the senators all returned to Texas. See Ralph Blumenthal, State Senate
Democrats Return to Texas, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2003, at A18.
3 See Act of Oct. 13, 2003, ch. 2, 2003 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3 (Vernon). As a result of
the redistricting plan, the Republican Party may pick up as many as seven seats. See, e.g.,
Edward Walsh, Redrawing Districts Raises Questions: No Precedent Seen for GOP Efforts,
WASH. POST, Oct. 26, 2003, at A4. The plan was subsequently cleared by the Justice
Department pursuant to its authority under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. See Dan
Eggen, Democrats Won’t Get Justice Memo: Texans Say Document Could Embarrass
GOP, WASH. POST, Jan. 22, 2004, at A23. In addition, a three-judge federal court rejected
myriad legal challenges leveled against the redistricting plan. See Session v. Perry, 298 F.
Supp. 2d 451, 457 (E.D. Tex. 2004), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Mar. 31, 2004) (No. 039644).
4 See Reid, supra note 1.
5 See Rhonda Cook, GOP Fights Redistricting in U.S. Court, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Jan.
6, 2004, at B3; Rhonda Cook, GOP Pushes Redistricting As Next Issue, ATLANTA J.
CONST., July 28, 2003, at B1.
6 See Juliet Eilperin, Politics: Deciding Where to Draw the Lines, WASH. POST, Aug.
20, 2003, at A6 (reporting that Ohio Republicans are considering revisions to congressional
district lines drawn in that state following 2000 census); David M. Halbfinger, Across U.S.,
Redistricting as a Never-Ending Battle, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2003, at A1 (noting that
Democrats are “dropping hints about taking the redistricting battle to big game territory:
Illinois and California”).
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on a fixed ten-year cycle.7 The general root of this assumption, Baker
v. Carr 8 and its progeny, did partially regularize the timing of the
redistricting process. In cases following Baker, the Supreme Court
held that election districts had to adhere to the principle of “one
person, one vote.”9 To enforce this principle, the Court imposed an
upper limit on the timing of redistricting, requiring districts to be
redrawn following each census;10 and it backed up this temporal
ceiling by authorizing federal courts to refashion districts when states
failed to act.11 Undiscussed in the case law and commentary, however, is the fact that this regulation of redistricting timing is partial;
courts have never held that federal constitutional law imposes a complementary limitation on the frequency of redistricting.12 While a
handful of states prohibit mid-decade redistricting as a matter of state
law,13 the recent events demonstrate that the general absence of a
temporal floor on the redistricting cycle leaves most states free to
redistrict as frequently as they wish.
The sudden shift in the political norms governing redistricting
raises the question whether the general absence of a procedural rule
limiting the frequency of redistricting should be cause for concern.
Certainly the Democrats in Texas wish that their state legislature was
legally prohibited from redistricting more than once per decennial
cycle. Crass partisan wishes aside, however, would such a rule pro7 For examples of this assumption, see D AVID B UTLER & B RUCE C AIN ,
CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING: COMPARATIVE AND THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 43–44
(1992), which notes that the Supreme Court’s one person, one vote cases regularized redistricting “so that almost all levels of government down to the local school districts are on a
ten-year cycle.”
8 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
9 See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577 (1964) (“[T]he Equal Protection Clause
requires that a State make an honest and good faith effort to construct districts . . . as
nearly of equal population as is practicable.”); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 18 (1964)
(holding that Article I, Section 2 of Constitution requires congressional districts to adhere
to principle of one person, one vote); see also infra notes 31–34 and accompanying text.
10 See infra note 36.
11 See infra note 37.
12 Challengers to Texas’s new redistricting plan argued that the Federal Constitution
does prohibit states from redrawing congressional districts more than once each decennial
census cycle, but a three-judge federal court rejected the plaintiffs’ arguments. Session v.
Perry, 298 F. Supp. 2d 451, 458–68 (E.D. Tex. 2004), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Mar. 31,
2004) (No. 03-9644).
13 See infra Part III.A (surveying existing state regulation of redistricting timing). The
Colorado Supreme Court recently struck down that state’s re-redistricting legislation on
that ground. See People ex rel. Salazar v. Davidson, 79 P.3d 1221, 1226 (Colo. 2003)
(holding that Article V, Section 44 of Colorado Constitution “not only requires redistricting after a federal census and before the ensuing general election, but also restricts the
legislature from redistricting at any other time”), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Colo.
Gen. Assembly v. Salazar, 72 U.S.L.W. 3506 (U.S. Jan. 28, 2004) (No. 03-1082).
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mote more politically fair districting arrangements? Both scholars
and the Supreme Court have identified partisan fairness as a central
concern of redistricting.14 The Supreme Court held in Davis v.
Bandemer 15 that partisan gerrymandering claims are justiciable under
the Equal Protection Clause;16 likewise, commentators are in general
agreement that partisan gerrymandering is harmful, and that partisan
fairness is an important attribute of districted election systems.17
When judged from the perspective of political fairness, however, procedural redistricting rules have not fared well. Specifically, scholars
often argue that procedural redistricting rules—including the existing
temporal ceiling on the redistricting process—do little to curtail, and
sometimes even exacerbate, the problem of partisan
gerrymandering.18
This essay explores whether such skepticism is warranted with
respect to a procedural rule that the literature has never considered—
a temporal floor on redistricting. It concludes that it is not. Examining, for simplicity, a procedural limitation on the frequency of redistricting that prohibits redistricting more than once each decennial
14 For purposes of this essay, I use the terms “political fairness” and “partisan fairness”
interchangeably.
15 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
16 Id. at 123–27. For earlier arguments by individual Justices that partisan gerrymandering claims should be cognizable under the Constitution, see, for example, Karcher v.
Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 744 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“[P]olitical gerrymandering is
one species of single vote dilution that is proscribed by the Equal Protection Clause.”), and
id. at 787 (Powell, J., dissenting) (arguing that injuries resulting from political gerrymandering “may rise to constitutional dimensions”). The constitutional treatment of partisan
gerrymandering claims is before the Supreme Court again this Term. Last June, the Court
noted probable jurisdiction in Vieth v. Jubelirer, 123 S. Ct. 2652 (2003), in which the plaintiffs claim that Pennsylvania’s congressional redistricting plan constitutes an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander. See Vieth v. Pennsylvania, 241 F. Supp. 2d 478, 484–85 (M.D.
Pa. 2003) (dismissing partisan gerrymandering claim).
17 See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARV. L.
REV. 593, 601–11 (2002) [hereinafter Issacharoff, Political Cartels]; Samuel Issacharoff,
Judging Politics: The Elusive Quest for Judicial Review of Political Fairness, 71 TEX. L.
REV. 1643, 1646–47 (1993) [hereinafter Issacharoff, Judging Politics]; Pamela S. Karlan,
The Rights to Vote: Some Pessimism About Formalism, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1716 (1993);
see also POLITICAL GERRYMANDERING AND THE COURTS, at viii (Bernard Grofman ed.,
1990); Michael W. McConnell, The Redistricting Cases: Original Mistakes and Current
Consequences, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 103, 112–13 (2000); Peter H. Schuck, The
Thickest Thicket: Partisan Gerrymandering and Judicial Regulation of Politics, 87 COLUM.
L. REV. 1325, 1330 (1987). But see Larry Alexander, Lost in the Political Thicket, 41 FLA.
L. REV. 563, 575–78 (1989) (arguing there is “no demonstrable harm” associated with partisan gerrymanders); Daniel H. Lowenstein & Jonathan Steinberg, The Quest for
Legislative Districting in the Public Interest: Elusive or Illusory, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1, 74–75
(1985) (arguing that redistricting should be viewed as any other political contest).
18 See infra Part I.
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cycle,19 the essay argues that two principal features of such a temporal
floor should curb the effects of partisan gerrymandering. First, the
delay between redistrictings imposed by such a rule promotes beneficial uncertainty in the redistricting process. This uncertainty should
lower levels of bias by causing the effects of partisan gerrymanders to
erode over time. Second, the limitation on redistricting frequency
partially randomizes control over the redistricting process. This
randomization makes it less likely that redistricting will occur under
conditions favoring partisan gerrymandering.
This essay proceeds in three parts. Part I introduces partisan fairness as a central concern of redistricting jurisprudence and scholarship, and surveys the general critique that process-based redistricting
regulations are ineffective at preventing partisan gerrymandering.
Part II then explains how, contrary to this general critique, a lower
temporal bound should serve to curb the effects of partisan gerrymandering. Part III concludes by exploring which institutions—states,
Congress, or federal courts—could impose a temporal floor on federal
and nonfederal redistricting.
I
THE CRITICISMS OF PROCEDURAL
REDISTRICTING REGULATIONS
The reapportionment revolution sparked by Baker v. Carr 20 and
its progeny secured one kind of fairness in districted elections. In
those cases, the Supreme Court constitutionalized the now-famous
principle of “one person, one vote” and held that election districts
must have roughly equal populations to comply with that principle.21
But population fairness was not the only kind of fairness that the
Court was attempting to promote. From Baker forward, the Court
also has been concerned with political fairness—that is, fairness
between different partisan groups of voters.22 The promise of the
Court’s equipopulation requirement23 was that it also would promote
19 I refer to such a rule throughout this essay as a bar on “interim redistricting” or “offcycle redistricting.”
20 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
21 See infra notes 29–34.
22 I define partisan fairness in more detail in Part II. For purposes of this essay, when I
refer to “partisan gerrymanders” I mean only redistricting that introduces partisan unfairness into a districting arrangement. Partisan fairness is not, of course, the only kind of
fairness at stake in redistricting generally or in the Supreme Court’s voting rights jurisprudence in particular. See, e.g., White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765–66 (1973) (holding that
Constitution entails commitment to racial fairness in districting arrangements). Nonetheless, this essay is concerned only with partisan fairness.
23 See infra note 33 and accompanying text.
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political fairness by thwarting the efforts of redistricters to fashion
partisan gerrymanders. And more recently, the Court in Davis v.
Bandemer formally constitutionalized its concern for partisan fairness
in redistricting, holding that claims of partisan gerrymandering are
cognizable under the Equal Protection Clause.24
Like the Court, many legal scholars and political scientists are in
general agreement that partisan fairness is a normatively desirable
feature of districted elections.25 Nonetheless, scholars are uniformly
critical of the Court’s efforts to promote political fairness. Davis v.
Bandemer’s test for partisan gerrymandering has been criticized as
imprudent, unenforceable, or both.26 More important for present purposes, scholars also have roundly criticized the reapportionment
revolution’s process-based regulations as ineffective at promoting partisan fairness.27 In fact, there is general pessimism about the ability of
process-based regulations (judicially imposed or otherwise) to thwart
partisan gerrymandering efforts. Unconsidered by this literature,
however, are the partisan consequences of a temporal floor on the
redistricting process.
Redistricting regulations can be thought of as falling loosely into
three categories: process-based regulations, outcome-based regulations, and institution-selecting regulations. Process-based regulations
are those that require existing redistricting authorities to adhere to
certain procedural or form-related requirements when they undertake
redistricting. Examples of such rules include an equipopulation
requirement, a requirement that districts be redrawn following each
decennial census, a requirement that districts be compact or conform
to local political boundaries where possible, and so on. Outcomebased regulations are those that directly test districting outcomes
against some metric of fairness, such as partisan fairness or racial fairness. Institution-selecting rules determine the persons or institutions
empowered to engage in redistricting. Rules shifting redistricting
authority from the state legislative process to bipartisan or “nonpartisan” commissions are the most common of this type.28
24 478 U.S. 109, 123–27 (1986). As I noted above, the Supreme Court this Term is
reviewing a partisan gerrymandering case for the first time since Bandemer. See Vieth v.
Jubelirer, 123 S. Ct. 2652 (2003) (noting probable jurisdiction); supra note 16; infra notes
188–190 and accompanying text.
25 See supra note 17. This essay takes as a premise of its argument the position that
political fairness in redistricting is normatively desirable; it does not rehearse the arguments in favor of this position.
26 See infra note 49.
27 See infra notes 38–52 and accompanying text.
28 This taxonomy is useful, but it certainly does not represent the only way that one
could categorize redistricting regulations. For another approach, see, for example,

R
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The Supreme Court’s reapportionment revolution imposed several constitutional process-based constraints on redistricting politics.
In Baker v. Carr,29 the Court for the first time held that challenges to
the constitutionality of legislative districting schemes are justiciable
under the Equal Protection Clause.30 Subsequent cases imposed three
specific constraints. First, the Court in Reynolds v. Sims 31 and
Wesberry v. Sanders 32 required that state legislative and congressional
district plans adhere to the principle of one person, one vote—a principle that the Court interpreted to require that legislative districts contain roughly equal numbers of people.33 This equipopulation
requirement evolved to require greater population precision in federal
districts than nonfederal districts, but the general requirement applies
nonetheless to essentially all legislative districting schemes today
(save the United States Senate).34 Second, the Court required that
election districts be redrawn periodically in order to comply with the
equipopulation requirement.35 In practice, this requirement of periodic adjustment quickly became a rule requiring that districts be
Issacharoff, Judging Politics, supra note 17, at 1647, which divides redistricting regulations
into ex post and ex ante rules. Moreover, the rough classification I employ is not analytically precise. Many rules that appear to fall naturally into one category can be easily recast
into another. For example, the Supreme Court’s prohibition on partisan gerrymandering,
generally thought of as an outcome-evaluating regulation, can be reconceptualized as an
institution-selecting rule, because it transfers to the judiciary the final authority to determine the partisan-based validity of redistricting plans. Relatedly, the equipopulation rule
is an outcome-evaluating regulation to the extent that one is interested in the inherent
value of having equipopulous districts, but is a process-based rule to the extent one is
interested in the partisan fairness of districting outcomes. As a matter of convention, the
equipopulation requirement, compactness requirements, and the like are treated as process-based constraints precisely because the literature focuses principally on the capacity of
these rules to promote political fairness (and, relatedly, because the literature is skeptical
of the inherent value of constraints like compactness).
29 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
30 Id. at 208–37. Prior to Baker v. Carr, a plurality of the Court had ruled that such
challenges constituted nonjusticiable political questions. See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S.
549 (1946); see also, e.g., South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276 (1950).
31 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
32 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
33 See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 577–81; Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 7–9, 18.
34 See White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 763 (1973) (noting that congressional districts
are subject to stricter numerical standards than are state legislative districts); Avery v.
Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 476 (1968) (applying one person, one vote principle to local
governments); cf. Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719,
730 (1973) (exempting special-purpose district from equipopulation requirement). While
the equipopulation requirement applies to nearly all legislative districts, this essay is specifically concerned only with state legislative and congressional redistricting. It does not discuss local redistricting practices.
35 See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 583.
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redrawn following each census.36 Third, the Court empowered federal
courts to fashion district maps in cases where states failed to redistrict
in a timely manner following the decennial census.37
The procedural incidents of the equipopulation doctrine—the
decennial redistricting requirement backed by the threat of judicial
intervention—partially regularized the redistricting process. Where
many states previously redistricted only when the legislature decided
to do so, congressional and state legislative district lines now had to be
redrawn following each census. As I noted at the outset, however, the
one person, one vote jurisprudence did not fully regularize redistricting. Under this doctrine, states currently remain free as a matter
of federal constitutional law to redistrict more frequently than once
per decennial census cycle. And with a few notable exceptions that I
discuss in Part III, states are also free to do so under state law.
The equipopulation rule itself has been widely criticized for
addressing only the problem of numerical equality and ignoring alto36 It is interesting to note that Reynolds itself did not lay down a rule that states must
redistrict immediately following each census. In fact, Reynolds did not even hold that
decennial redistricting was constitutionally mandatory; rather, the Court held that the
failure to redistrict decennially would raise a presumption of unconstitutionality. See id. at
583–84 (“Decennial reapportionment appears to be a rational approach to readjustment of
legislative representation in order to take into account population shifts and growth. . . .
[W]e do not intend to indicate that decennial reapportionment is a constitutional requisite . . . . But if reapportionment were accomplished with less frequency, it would assuredly
be constitutionally suspect.”); see also infra Part III.C. Later cases have assumed, however,
that the release of new decennial census data invalidates districts drawn using data from
the previous census. See, e.g., Arrington v. Elections Bd., 173 F. Supp. 2d 856, 860 (E.D.
Wis. 2001) (holding that existing districts become unconstitutional upon release of new
decennial census data); see also Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 123 S. Ct. 2498, 2516 n.2
(2003) (“After the new enumeration, no districting plan is likely to be legally enforceable if
challenged, given the shifts and changes in a population over 10 years.”); Karlan, supra
note 17, at 1726 (“Once the decennial census figures are released, virtually every existing
apportionment scheme becomes instantly unconstitutional because of a decade of population shifts.”); Note, Federal Court Involvement in Redistricting Litigation, 114 HARV. L.
REV. 878, 878 (2001) (“The 2000 census, like each prior census, will indicate not only
changes in overall population size but also changes in population distribution. . . . These
population shifts will render federal, state, and local district maps unconstitutional under
the ‘one person, one vote’ requirement of Reynolds v. Sims.”).
37 See Scott v. Germano, 381 U.S. 407, 409–10 (1965) (per curiam) (“[I]n the event a
valid reapportionment plan . . . is not timely adopted [the District Court] may enter such
orders as it deems appropriate . . . .”); see also Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 33–37 (1993)
(discussing circumstances in which federal courts can undertake reapportionment). The
Court has made clear, however, that federal courts must refrain from intervening until it is
clear that the state will otherwise not have a valid plan in place in time for the next election. Id. at 33–35; see also Germano, 381 U.S. at 409 (requiring district court to “stay[ ] its
hand” unless state failed to redistrict “within ample time to permit such plan to be utilized
in the [upcoming] election”). See generally Pamela S. Karlan, All Over the Map: The
Supreme Court’s Voting Rights Trilogy, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 258–61; Note, supra note
36.
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gether other problems of representational fairness—including partisan fairness.38 While the doctrine has substantially equalized the
populations of legislative districts throughout the country, it does not
directly prohibit redistricting authorities from gerrymandering district
lines in a way that unfairly favors one political party and disfavors
another.39 It is true that the doctrine formally cabins legislative discretion by requiring districts to be drawn with equal populations—a
fact that the Supreme Court initially appeared to think would defeat
partisan gerrymandering efforts.40 Despite this initial optimism, however, legal scholars and political scientists have uniformly argued that
the Court was wrong to believe that the equipopulation rule would
promote partisan fairness in redistricting.41 The requirement that districts be drawn with equal populations does little to restrict the districting possibilities available to those in charge of the redistricting
38 Justice Harlan emphasized this point in his dissent in Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 622–24
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (“Recognizing that ‘indiscriminate districting’ is an invitation to
‘partisan gerrymandering,’ . . . the Court nevertheless excludes virtually every other basis
for the formation of electoral districts other than ‘indiscriminate districting.’”); see also
Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542, 551 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“The fact of the
matter is that the rule of absolute equality is perfectly compatible with ‘gerrymandering’ of
the worst sort.”); cf. Lucas v. Colo. Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 748–51 & n.12 (1964)
(Stewart, J., dissenting) (arguing that exclusive focus on numerical equality ignores many
factors necessary to ensuring fair representation). This potential shortcoming of the reapportionment revolution also has been a recurring theme in voting rights scholarship for the
past several decades. See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, The Costs and Causes of Minimalism in
Voting Cases: Baker v. Carr and Its Progeny, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1411, 1419–21, 1437–38
(2002); Richard H. Pildes, The Theory of Political Competition, 85 VA. L. REV. 1605, 1608
(1999); Robert J. Sickels, Dragons, Bacon Strips and Dumbbells—Who’s Afraid of
Reapportionment?, 75 YALE L.J. 1300, 1300 (1966).
39 See, e.g., Andrew Gelman & Gary King, Enhancing Democracy Through Legislative
Redistricting, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 541, 553 (1994) (“[A]s most political scientists recognize, population equality guarantees almost no form of fairness beyond the numerical
equality of population.”).
40 See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 578–79 (describing indiscriminate districting as “an open
invitation to partisan gerrymandering”); Issacharoff, Judging Politics, supra note 17, at
1648 (“As conceived by the Supreme Court in the 1960s, the reliance on numerical standards of apportionment was to serve three purposes. . . . Third, the existence of objective
measures would defeat attempts to gerrymander districting schemes . . . .”); SAMUEL
ISSACHAROFF ET AL., THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL
PROCESS 175 (rev. 2d ed. 2001) (making similar argument); cf. PHILIP MUSGROVE, THE
GENERAL THEORY OF GERRYMANDERING 57 (1977) (“[I]t was expected that the elimination of population disparities would by itself remove most of the partisan advantage to be
gained from districting.”). The Supreme Court also suggested at the time that other process-based rules might help limit partisan gerrymandering. See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 581
(“[A] State may legitimately desire to construct districts along political subdivision lines to
deter the possibilities of gerrymandering.”).
41 See, e.g., GARY W. COX & JONATHAN N. KATZ, ELBRIDGE GERRY’S SALAMANDER:
THE ELECTORAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE REAPPORTIONMENT REVOLUTION 27 (2002);
Issacharoff, Judging Politics, supra note 17, at 1645–46.
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process.42 As the next Part describes in more detail, it is theoretically
straightforward to draw district boundaries that enclose equal populations while still biasing the districting map in favor of one political
party or another.43 Moreover, the increasing availability of computerized redistricting in the 1970s and 1980s made this theoretical possibility easy to accomplish in practice.44 Even the Court has
acknowledged more recently that rigid adherence to numerical
equality has not guaranteed other forms of fairness.45 And beyond
the conclusion that the equipopulation rule is ineffective at ensuring
political fairness, Richard Engstrom and others have argued that the
Court’s reliance on the one person, one vote standard might actually
promote partisan gerrymandering.46
To be sure, the equipopulation rule’s focus on numerical equality
does not preclude the possibility that the one person, one vote jurisprudence writ large will promote political fairness in redistricting.
The jurisprudence does impose additional procedural restrictions on
redistricting politics: It partially regularizes the timing of redistricting
42 See MUSGROVE, supra note 40, at 52, 57; Karlan, supra note 17, at 1705–06; Sickels,
supra note 38, at 1300.
43 See infra Part II.A.2.
44 See Issacharoff, Judging Politics, supra note 17, at 1654; Karlan, supra note 37, at
256; Karlan, supra note 17, at 1706 (“Advances in the technology of districting, particularly
the increasing use of computers, made it quite feasible to comply with the requirement of
equipopulous districts while continuing to eviscerate the political strength of identifiable
groups of voters.”). See generally Michelle H. Browdy, Note, Computer Models and PostBandemer Redistricting, 99 YALE L.J. 1379 (1990) (discussing different ways computers
can be used in redistricting process).
45 See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 733 (1983) (“The rapid advances in computer
technology and education during the last two decades make it relatively simple to draw
contiguous districts of equal population and at the same time to further whatever secondary goals the State has.”); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 748–49 (1973) (concluding
that fair and effective representation “does not depend solely on mathematical equality
among district populations” and that “[a]n unrealistic overemphasis on raw population
figures, a mere nose count in the districts, may submerge these other considerations and
itself furnish a ready tool for ignoring factors that in day-to-day operation are important to
an acceptable representation and apportionment arrangement”); see also Davis v.
Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 113 (1986) (implicitly acknowledging shortcomings of equipopulation requirement by finding justiciable separate constitutional claim against partisan gerrymandering); cf. id. at 168 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(“[E]xclusive or primary reliance on ‘one person, one vote’ can betray the constitutional
promise of fair and effective representation by enabling a legislature to engage intentionally in clearly discriminatory gerrymandering.”); Karcher, 462 U.S. at 752 (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting that “mere numerical equality is not a sufficient guarantee of equal
representation” because “it protects groups only indirectly at best”).
46 See Richard L. Engstrom, The Supreme Court and Equipopulous Gerrymandering:
A Remaining Obstacle in the Quest for Fair and Effective Representation, 1976 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 277, 278–79; McConnell, supra note 17, at 103–04; see also HOWARD A. SCARROW,
PARTIES, ELECTIONS, & REPRESENTATION IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK 104–05 (1983);
Issacharoff, Judging Politics, supra note 17, at 1654–56 & n.60 (citing such arguments).
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by requiring political authorities to undertake redistricting following
each census, and it changes the effect of legislative deadlock by
authorizing courts to refashion district lines when the political
branches fail to do so. It is possible that these procedural rules—
either by restricting the redistricting options available to political
actors or by altering the political dynamics of redistricting—could
reduce the potential for political unfairness in redistricting.
Nevertheless, scholars have for the most part concluded that
these complementary procedural rules are ineffective constraints on
partisan gerrymandering. According to these scholars, the requirement that district lines be revised regularly does nothing to ensure
political fairness at the time when redistricting occurs.47 As with critiques of the equipopulation rule, criticism of the decennial redistricting
requirement and the judicial intervention it entails sometimes goes
beyond the argument that those rules are ineffective at promoting
political fairness in redistricting: Pam Karlan, for example, has suggested that the procedural incidents of the redistricting revolution
may actually increase the opportunities for parties to capture the
redistricting process and use it to achieve politically or racially motivated ends.48
These critiques of the Supreme Court’s one person, one vote
jurisprudence are part of a larger line of criticism against various process-based forms of redistricting regulation. The common complaints
are that such regulations miss the point by failing to focus on important aspects of fairness in redistricting, and more specifically that,
from the perspective of political fairness, they are ineffective at
curbing partisan gerrymandering.49 As with the equipopulation
47

See, e.g., Karlan, supra note 17, at 1726–37.
Id. at 1708, 1726–37; see also Karlan, supra note 37, at 256. Professor Karlan argues
that one person, one vote jurisprudence creates a race to the courthouse, where possibilities for forum shopping and the availability of favorable, discretionary judicial remedies
make it possible for political actors to capture the redistricting process. See Karlan, supra
note 17, at 1726–37.
49 See, e.g., BUTLER & CAIN, supra note 7, at 149–50 (noting that supposedly neutral
procedural restrictions create substantial “potential for mischief in the name of neutrality”). By focusing on the critiques of process-related redistricting regulations, I do not
mean to suggest that the other categories of regulation are free from criticism. Far from it.
There is general agreement among legal scholars, for example, that the outcome-based
constitutional prohibition against partisan gerrymandering set forth by the Supreme Court
in Davis v. Bandemer has been a miserable failure. See, e.g., Issacharoff, Political Cartels,
supra note 17, at 604–05. There is also a consistent thread of criticism leveled against
institution-selecting rules. Nathaniel Persily and others have argued that shifting redistricting authority from state legislatures to bipartisan or independent commissions will do
nothing to change the partisan nature of the redistricting process, and will, if anything,
serve only to submerge those partisan disputes and mislead the public about the partisan
nature of the process. See Nathaniel Persily, In Defense of Foxes Guarding Henhouses:
48
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requirement and its procedural incidents, critics contend that such
regulations are ineffective at promoting political fairness because it is
theoretically possible and often practically simple for redistricters to
comply with the process-based requirements while still introducing
substantial partisan unfairness into a districting scheme.50 This is true
of traditional district compactness requirements,51 contiguity mandates, requirements that districts preserve local political boundaries,52
and rules that districts conform to natural geographic features. Moreover, because these process-based limitations frequently conflict with
one another in implementation, imposing them on redistricting
authorities can actually empower those authorities to pursue partisan
ends under the guise of balancing the competing procedural interests.
Thus, much modern redistricting scholarship is knit together by
the consistent refrain that process-based redistricting regulations are
ineffective at promoting districts that are fair to both major parties. A
The Case for Judicial Acquiescence to Incumbent-Protecting Gerrymanders, 116 HARV. L.
REV. 649, 673–79 (2002); see also Alfred Balitzer, The Commission Experience: Studies of
Non-legislative Approaches to Redistricting, at iii (1980) (unpublished working paper, on
file with the Rose Institute, Claremont McKenna College) (arguing that “effort to mask
redistricting behind the façade of independent commissions has produced hypocrisy and
has often intensified the political struggle—although hiding it from the eyes of the
electorate”).
50 Some process-related rules do escape this criticism because they deprive redistricters
of information that the redistricters would need to engage in purposeful partisan gerrymandering. Such rules include requirements that political registration data and election
data be withheld from redistricting authorities. These information-depriving rules, however, are subject to several other criticisms. One is a practical objection: It is difficult to
see how, in practice, one could keep relevant political information from redistricting
authorities. Much of that data is public, and redistricting authorities are required by federal voting rights law to consider certain racial data that contains substantial political information. Even putting aside these practical concerns, scholars often criticize informationdepriving rules for merely replacing intentional political unfairness with random (and
potentially more severe) political unfairness.
51 See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, “Bizarre Districts,” and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92
MICH. L. REV. 483, 527–31 (1993) (surveying state-imposed compactness requirements and
concluding that they have been ineffective as constraints on redistricting). There is some
evidence that more quantitative (rather than traditional) compactness standards developed
by political scientists can better cabin legislative discretion, see, e.g., Daniel D. Polsby &
Robert D. Popper, The Third Criterion: Compactness as a Procedural Safeguard Against
Partisan Gerrymandering, 9 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 301, 332–34 (1991), though this may be
less true now that computer districting programs enable redistricters to create large numbers of potential districts, see Pildes & Niemi, supra, at 538 & n.178 (noting that commentators disagree over whether compactness can be effective constraint on gerrymandering).
Compactness requirements also are frequently criticized on the ground that they introduce
systematic partisan and racial biases into district plans. See, e.g., MUSGROVE, supra note
40, at 53; Lowenstein & Steinberg, supra note 17, at 23–25. See generally BRUCE E. CAIN,
THE REAPPORTIONMENT PUZZLE 35–38 (1984) (demonstrating that compact districts do
not accurately reflect partisan strength in electorate).
52 See Lowenstein & Steinberg, supra note 17, at 34.
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few political scientists recently have challenged this conventional
wisdom. Gary Cox and Jonathan Katz, for example, have criticized
the view that Reynolds’s decennial districting requirement and its
associated rules of judicial supervision have had no significant effect
(or a detrimental effect) on the practice or effects of partisan gerrymandering.53 Cox and Katz argue that, in the 1960s, these processbased rules changed the political dynamics of redistricting in a way
that helped eliminate the pro-Republican bias that had existed in congressional districting at that time.54 While the work of these political
scientists suggests that closer investigation of timing and process-oriented redistricting rules is sorely needed, and that the general critique
of such regulations may be at least partly wrong, the possibility of a
frequency limitation on redistricting remains entirely unexamined.
II
PROMOTING PARTISAN FAIRNESS THROUGH
PROCEDURAL REGULATION
Should we view a lower temporal bound on redistricting with the
skeptical attitude typically taken towards process-oriented redistricting rules? This Part argues that we should not: A limitation on
the frequency of redistricting should promote partisan fairness in districting arrangements. To show why this is so, Part II.A first elaborates on the meaning of partisan fairness. Part II.B then describes the
two features of the rule prohibiting interim redistricting that promote
such fairness: the uncertainty-inducing aspects of the rule and the
rule’s agenda-setting aspects. After explaining how these features
limit the power of state legislatures to enact effective gerrymanders,
Part II.C considers potential countervailing effects that might cut
against the benefits of a temporal floor.
Before turning to this discussion, I should note one caveat. My
aim is not to determine the optimal period for redistricting. Selecting
a theoretically “optimal” length for the redistricting cycle would
require making a number of normative judgments and empirical
determinations that exceed the scope of this essay. And in practice,
picking the best period would depend crucially on which institutions
were to be involved in the redistricting process. My aim is different: I
argue that, given the existing institutional framework within which
redistricting currently proceeds in the United States—where redis53 COX & KATZ, supra note 41, at 5–6; Gary W. Cox & Jonathan N. Katz, The
Reapportionment Revolution and Bias in U.S. Congressional Elections, 43 AM. J. POL. SCI.
812, 812–13 (1999).
54 COX & KATZ, supra note 41, at 5–6, 66–105.
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tricting must already occur once per decade (following the release of
the census) and where legislatures typically have initial responsibility
for drawing district lines—a rule prohibiting states from revising their
districts more than once per decennial census cycle would be
beneficial.
A. Partisan Bias and Political Gerrymanders
To see how a ban on interim redistricting might promote partisan
fairness, it is necessary first to define partisan fairness more precisely.
This Section defines partisan fairness as the absence of partisan bias in
a districting scheme, and then explains how a party in control of the
redistricting process would go about gerrymandering district lines to
introduce partisan bias.
1. Defining Partisan Fairness
Partisan fairness can mean many things. One might equate political fairness with proportional representation and conclude that election systems are politically fair only when they guarantee proportional
representation.55 Or one might contend that districted election systems can be politically fair only when self-interested, partisan legislators do not have a hand in drawing their own election districts. These
forms of fairness may well be important, but adopting them requires
challenging central features of the present redistricting system.
Removing partisan actors from the redistricting process would require
rejecting the Supreme Court’s frequent suggestion that redistricting is
principally the responsibility of state legislatures and arguing for the
invalidation of the redistricting practices of nearly every state.56 Committing to partisan fairness as proportional representation requires
even more: first, that one adopt an understanding of political fairness
that is quite controversial as a matter of democratic theory; second,
that one reject America’s system of districted elections, because proportional representation is deeply inconsistent with that system.57
55 At the opposite end of the spectrum, one could argue that a pure winner-take-all
system is most fair. There are also many possibilities between these endpoints.
56 See, e.g., Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 34 (1993) (“‘[R]eapportionment is primarily
the duty and responsibility of the State through its legislature or other body . . . .’”)
(quoting Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 27 (1975)); Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 414–15
(1977) (“‘[L]egislative reapportionment is primarily a matter for legislative consideration
and determination . . . .’”) (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 586 (1964)). For an
argument that the Court should invalidate all districting schemes created by partisan
actors, see Issacharoff, Political Cartels, supra note 17, at 601, 645–48.
57 For an explanation of this inconsistency, see infra notes 58–60 and accompanying
text.
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There is, however, a more limited understanding of political fairness that is normatively less controversial and that is consistent with
districted elections and legislative control of the districting process.
Partisan fairness on this account is simply the absence of partisan bias,
where partisan bias is the degree to which the electoral system makes
it easier for one party (and harder for the other) to translate its votes
into seats.
The structure of an electoral system helps determine how votes
translate into seats—that is, the way in which the partisan composition
of the legislature reflects the partisan preferences of voters. This
point is perhaps easiest to understand by considering first a pure
system of proportional representation. Because the partisan composition of the legislature in such a system is, by definition, proportional
to the partisan preferences of the electorate, the seats-votes relationship is linear. If Democrats garner 10% of the vote, they receive 10%
of the seats; 20% yields 20%, and so on. If one were to plot the translation of votes to seats for a system of proportional representation, the
seats-votes curve would be linear with a slope of one.
The single-member-district plurality (SMP) voting system that is
prevalent in the United States almost never leads to a linear seatsvotes curve. Instead, the winner-take-all feature of each district typically leads to a system-wide “winner’s bonus.” The party that receives
a majority of the vote (in a two-party system) generally gets a greater
percentage of seats than it does votes. To see why this is so, consider
the limiting case in which each party receives the same vote share in
every district. The party that receives a slim majority (say, 51%) will
win every seat, because the party receives that same majority in every
seat. In practice, of course, parties do not receive the same vote share
in every district. Still, there is generally a system-wide winner’s bonus,
leading the seats-votes curve for an SMP system to be S-shaped, with
each party receiving a seat bonus when it obtains more than 50% of
the vote.58 (Figure 1 provides an example of such a curve where each
party receives the same winner’s bonus, and includes for reference the
58 Formally, the relationship between seats and votes in a single-member-district plurality (SMP) system typically is described in the redistricting literature according to the
following formula, which is based on the classic “cube law”:

Here “s” denotes the share of legislative seats for a party and “v” represents the vote share
for that party. It is important to note that the law is empirical, not deductive or deterministic. Moreover, the exponent is simply a measure of responsiveness present in any given
districting plan, and so will not be the same in different contexts. See COX & KATZ, supra
note 41, at 34; Gary King & Robert X. Browning, Democratic Representation and Partisan
Bias in Congressional Elections, 81 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1251, 1253 (1987).
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linear seats-votes relationship of a system of proportional representation.) While such a system does not approximate proportional representation, it can remain unbiased in the sense that votes for each party
will, under certain circumstances, translate into seats in the same
fashion.
FIGURE 1
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Partisan bias, then, is represented not by nonlinearity but by
asymmetry in each political party’s translation of votes to seats.59
Asymmetry in the votes-seats relationship makes it easier for one
party to win seats than the other. In an unbiased system, each party
receives the same number of seats for a given fraction of votes. If
53% of the vote for Democrats translates into 60% of the seats going
to that party, then the Republicans should also capture 60% of the
seats if they garner 53% of the vote. In a system biased in favor of
Democrats, however, Democrats would get more seats than
59 Although the absence of partisan bias can be easily expressed at a conceptual level,
measuring bias is not nearly as straightforward. See King & Browning, supra note 58, at
1252. The political science literature employs a number of different methodologies for
measuring this feature of districting plans, and there are disagreements about the advantages and shortcomings of various measures.
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Republicans for the same vote share.60 Defining partisan fairness as
the absence of partisan bias, rather than as a deviation from a linear
seats-votes relationship, usefully separates the concern for partisan
unfairness from disputes over representational theory. This makes it
possible to identify unfair partisan advantage in a districting plan
without committing to proportional representation.61
2. Gerrymandering to Create Partisan Bias
With an understanding of partisan bias in hand, it is easy to see
how parties in control of the redistricting process can introduce partisan bias into a districting scheme. Partisan gerrymandering is made
possible by a jurisdiction’s political geography—that is, by the uneven
spatial distribution of voters with varying political loyalties. If
Republican and Democratic voters were distributed perfectly evenly
throughout a state, election district boundaries would have no effect
on electoral outcomes.62 In reality, however, the partisanship of
voters is not evenly distributed. Urban centers tend to favor
Democrats, wealthy areas tend to favor Republicans, and so on. Innumerable factors, including demographic, cultural, and historical
dynamics, produce spatial concentrations and dispersions of voters
with varying political interests and loyalties.63
Redistricters can take advantage of this lumpy distribution by
drawing district lines to include or exclude pockets of voters in a way
that systematically favors one political party. To bias a districting plan
in favor of Republicans, for example, redistricting authorities “pack”
60 This conception of partisan bias does put to one side the argument that partisan bias
cannot, or should not, be measured meaningfully at the legislature-wide level for state
legislatures or at the congressional-delegation level for Congress. Measuring partisan gerrymanders at these institutional levels is common in both the jurisprudence and the literature, however, so I adopt that perspective here. See, e.g., Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109,
127 (1986) (evaluating state legislative gerrymandering claim on statewide basis); Vieth v.
Pennsylvania, 241 F. Supp. 2d 478, 484–85 (M.D. Pa. 2003) (incorporating partisan gerrymandering discussion from Vieth v. Pennsylvania, 188 F. Supp. 2d 532, 539–40 (M.D. Pa.
2002), which evaluated congressional partisan gerrymandering claim on statewide basis),
prob. juris. noted sub nom. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 123 S. Ct. 2652 (2003).
61 Thus, it is incorrect to suggest, as some have, that the concept of a partisan gerrymander can or should be understood only by reference to the concept of proportional
representation. See, e.g., Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 155–59 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment); Schuck, supra note 17, at 1357; cf. SCARROW, supra note 46, at 103–05 (suggesting
that partisan fairness in districting should be measured by reference to rough proportionality, but then acknowledging concept of winner’s bonus).
62 Of course, such a system would also constitute a perfect winner-take-all arrangement; the party that received a majority of votes would win every seat.
63 For a discussion of the fact that single-member-districted elections disadvantage
overly dispersed and overly concentrated minorities relative to a system of proportional
representation, see DOUGLAS W. RAE, THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF ELECTORAL
LAWS 25–39, 99–103, 134–37 (1967).
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and “crack” voters who tend to support Democrats. Packing
Democratic voters into a small number of districts where they constitute large super-majorities ensures Democratic victories in those districts but lowers the total number of seats Democrats capture by
increasing the number of wasted Democratic votes—that is, votes cast
for Democrats that are either unnecessary or insufficient to win a
seat.64 Cracking, the complement of packing, similarly wastes
Democratic votes by splitting blocks of Democratic voters into a
number of districts where Republican voters will predominate. By
maximizing the number of wasted votes for the other party and minimizing the number of wasted votes for itself, a party in control of
redistricting distributes its votes more efficiently, and thereby biases a
districting plan in its favor.65
One product of this strategy, of course, is that the predicted
margin of victory in the favored party’s seats generally will be lower
than the predicted margin in the disfavored party’s seats.66 This feature of partisan gerrymanders, commonly referred to as the seatssecurity tradeoff, is important to understanding the likely effect of a
temporal floor on redistricting.
To see the seats-security tradeoff more concretely, consider a
hypothetical world in which the partisanship of voters is known and
fixed. In order to maximize bias in this world, a party in control of
redistricting would spread its voters thinly so that those voters constituted a bare majority in the maximum possible number of districts.67
But in the real world, where voters’ partisan preferences are not fixed
and are often difficult to predict, such a plan would be far too risky. A
party that spreads itself too thinly among its districts risks substantial
losses at the polls if its predictions about voting behavior turn out to
64 Issacharoff, Judging Politics, supra note 17, at 1661–62 & nn.97 & 99; Polsby &
Popper, supra note 51, at 303–04; Schuck, supra note 17, at 1341.
65 See CAIN, supra note 51, at 148 (“[T]he way that a party secures an unfair advantage
is by maximizing the ratio of its efficient seats to the other party’s inefficient seats. Efficiency in this sense means lessening, and inefficiency means increasing, the number of
wasted votes.”); Schuck, supra note 17, at 1341. For a more technical discussion of how
one theoretically maximizes a gerrymander in this way, see MUSGROVE, supra note 40, at
8–28.
66 See CAIN, supra note 51, at 148–49 (“The efficient distribution [of votes to seats] may
involve making previously safe seats riskier. . . . [I]t is a crucial impediment to a partisan
gerrymander.”); see also DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESSIONAL REPRESENTATION:
THEORY AND PRACTICE IN DRAWING THE DISTRICTS, in REAPPORTIONMENT IN THE 1970S,
at 249, 277 (Nelson W. Polsby ed., 1971) (explaining that partisan gerrymander increases
marginality of controlling party’s districts). For an example of the seats-security tradeoff in
practice, see CAIN, supra note 51, at 87–89, which discusses the security tradeoffs that
Republicans predicted Democrats would have to make to engage in partisan gerrymandering in California in 1981.
67 See Issacharoff, Judging Politics, supra note 17, at 1662.
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be imperfect. For that reason, a party in control of redistricting must
balance the potential seat pickup of a plan against the risk that its
current seats will become less secure.68
B. The Potential Benefits of a Temporal Floor on Redistricting
Restricting the frequency with which states can redistrict should
promote lower levels of partisan bias and reduce the likelihood that a
political party will be able to establish a long-term partisan lock-up of
the political process. This claim may initially seem implausible. After
all, it is commonly argued that procedural redistricting regulations are
ineffective at curtailing partisan gerrymanders. As this Section
explains, however, both the uncertainty-inducing and control-randomizing aspects of a legally enforced temporal floor on redistricting
should reduce the severity and frequency of partisan gerrymanders.69
1. Uncertainty and Delay
A rule limiting the frequency of redistricting promotes beneficial
uncertainty in the redistricting process. Redistricting is generally an
uncertain enterprise because it is difficult to predict how voters will
behave in future elections. Some useful predictions are of course possible. Were they not, the practice of partisan gerrymandering would
not exist—or, at least, gerrymandering efforts would be entirely ineffective. While redistricting authorities can make some predictions
about voting behavior, however, the accuracy of those predictions
68 For more theoretical discussions of the tradeoffs that risk averse parties make in the
face of uncertainty, see COX & KATZ, supra note 41, at 35–38; MUSGROVE, supra note 40,
at 28–35; Guillermo Owen & Bernard Grofman, Optimal Partisan Gerrymandering, 7 POL.
GEOGRAPHY Q. 5, 5–12 (1988).
69 It is important to point out that, even putting the question of partisan gerrymandering to one side, there are reasons one might favor a temporal floor. It is possible, for
example, that limiting the frequency of redistricting might cut costs—both political and
economic—by preventing the further erosion of the legitimacy of the redistricting process
and by preventing the possibility that a cycle of redistricting retaliation will ensue. See
supra note 4 and accompanying text. Relatedly, prohibiting frequent redistricting battles
may free up legislative agenda space for other pressing issues. There also may be representational advantages to curtailing the frequency of redistricting. A prohibition on interim
redistricting could arguably strengthen constituent-representative ties—touted by some as
a principal benefit of districted elections—by preventing constituents from being moved
frequently from district to district. While these other arguments are not the focus of this
essay, I should note that there are some difficulties associated with them. For one thing,
measuring and evaluating the political and financial costs of more frequent redistricting is
an extremely difficult task. Moreover, the inter-election constituent-representative connection—as opposed to the intra-election connection—is not an uncontroversial representational good; arguments in favor of that connection frequently are linked with various
competition-reducing, incumbency-protecting rules, the benefit of which is highly contested. See, e.g., Issacharoff, Political Cartels, supra note 17, at 611–30 (criticizing anticompetitive redistricting practices).
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decreases as one moves further in time from the point of prediction.
This uncertainty has two related effects in a world where redistricting
authorities are prohibited from redrawing district maps more than
once each decade. First, increasing uncertainty and variability in
voting behavior over time makes it likely that the effect of a partisan
gerrymander—particularly an egregious one—will gradually fade out.
As a corollary, prohibiting redistricting authorities from redrawing
districts multiple times during a single decennial cycle prevents those
authorities from adjusting district lines to correct for variations in
voting behavior over time. This precludes those in control of districting from optimizing partisan bias over time.70
As explained above, producing a partisan gerrymander requires
drawing district lines to increase the efficiency of votes for one party
and decrease the efficiency of votes for the other. To do this, however, redistricters must be able to identify partisan groups of voters in
order to favor one group and disfavor the other. Determining the partisanship of voters presents two problems, one conceptual and one
empirical.
The concept of a partisan “group” of voters is somewhat fuzzy.
In order to conclude that voters with a certain partisanship have been
disadvantaged by the redistricting process, one must decide how to
define the partisan identity of a given voter. But several different definitions are available. Partisanship might be defined by reference to
certain indicators of party identification or loyalty, such as party registration. Alternately, partisanship might be defined solely by reference
to voting behavior. Moreover, to the extent that a measure of partisanship is endogenous to districting arrangements or other election
day conditions, one might disagree that the measure actually describes
partisanship in a way that is meaningful for purposes of evaluating the
partisan fairness of a districting scheme.71
70 One way to conceptualize this aspect of a limitation on the frequency of districting is
as a temporal veil of ignorance. The rule deprives redistricting authorities at time t 1 of
information that they need to determine what districting scheme will maximize their
advantage at time t 2 (or over the period from t 1 to t 2). As a formal matter, the veil of
ignorance analogy is imprecise. As Rawls described it, a veil of ignorance is a device that
deprives a person of information about her own position in the future. See JOHN RAWLS,
A THEORY OF JUSTICE 118–23 (rev. ed. 1999). In contrast, the temporal floor on redistricting deprives redistricters of information about the position (or rather behavior) of
other people in the future. See generally Adrian Vermeule, Veil of Ignorance Rules in
Constitutional Law, 111 YALE L.J. 399 (2001) (discussing different ways in which veil of
ignorance rules introduce uncertainty). Despite the formal distinction, the mechanisms
have the same sort of effect.
71 For such an argument, see MARK E. RUSH, DOES REDISTRICTING MAKE A
DIFFERENCE?: PARTISAN REPRESENTATION AND ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR 126–30 (1993).

\\server05\productn\N\NYU\79-3\NYU301.txt

June 2004]

unknown

Seq: 21

PARTISAN FAIRNESS AND REDISTRICTING POLITICS

1-JUL-04

9:31

771

These conceptual concerns aside, the slipperiness of partisan
identity points to the more practical problem that redistricters face—
that individual and group voting patterns are not consistent, cohesive,
or fully coherent across different contexts or over time.72 Myriad factors lead voters to behave differently, and unpredictably, over time.
These factors can be grouped loosely into two large categories: candidate-centered and party-related. Candidate-centered factors include
all of the district-specific conditions under which an election takes
place; they include the effects of incumbency, of the retirement of an
incumbent, of the quality of a particular incumbent or challenger, and
so on. Party-related variability, on the other hand, reflects changes in
partisan voting behavior that are not related to candidate-centered
effects, but instead reflect changes in individual voters’ attachments to
the different political parties.73
Thus, as popular candidates come and go, as a party’s fortunes
change across a region or with respect to a certain population, and as
other factors shift the political landscape, the partisan voting behavior
of voters also changes. This is true both for individual voters and for
groups of voters distributed around a state. Accordingly, the spatial
concentrations and dispersions of votes for each party will shift over
time. As a result, initial predictions about partisan voting behavior
become less and less accurate as time passes. Regardless of the types
of information on which redistricting authorities choose to rely to predict voting behavior—be it political registration data, previous election-returns data, demographic data, or some combination of the
above74—the extent to which patterns of partisan voting behavior
deviate from that predicted will increase over time.75
The increasing variance between voting predictions and voting
behavior can undermine, over time, the political advantage that initially results from a partisan gerrymander. A party in control of the
redistricting process initially obtains that advantage by increasing the
efficiency of its seats while decreasing the efficiency of the other
72 Cf. BUTLER & CAIN, supra note 7, at 9 (noting that “[i]n an era in which party
loyalty has been steadily declining, it is hard to predict whether a change in district composition will necessarily lead to a change in partisan composition”); Richard H. Pildes, Is
Voting Rights Law Now at War With Itself?: Social Science and Voting Rights in the 2000s,
80 N.C. L. REV. 1517, 1529–39 (2002) (documenting decline in racially polarized voting in
South).
73 See generally RUSH, supra note 71, at 43–49, 68 (discussing different mechanisms that
might affect voting behavior).
74 For redistricting purposes, many states supplement census data (which contains
information about total population, voting age population, race, ethnicity, gender, income,
education, and other things) with voter registration data and returns from a variety of
previous elections. See BUTLER & CAIN, supra note 7, at 58.
75 See MUSGROVE, supra note 40, at 29–30.
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party’s seats. By definition though, efficiency here is a function of the
expected margin of victory in different seats. This is why partisan gerrymanders are conventionally understood to involve a trade-off
between seats and security: In order to introduce bias and augment its
seat share, a party often must trade away some reelection safety by
making its districts more marginal.76 The crucial point is that this
greater marginality makes those districts more vulnerable to uncertainty. The smaller the expected margin of victory in a seat, the
greater the probability that, over time, growing differences between
voting behavior and redistricters’ predictions about that behavior will
alter the outcome of an election for that seat. As time passes, upsets
are more likely to occur in districts held by the party favored in the
last round of redistricting than in districts held by the disfavored
party.
The effects of partisan gerrymanders are therefore likely to erode
over time—particularly the effects of gerrymanders that introduce a
high degree of bias into the system. This is not to say, of course, that
such erosion will always occur. There are certainly instances in which
it is possible for a party to gerrymander a districting map without
making any significant sacrifice in the security of its own seats.77
There are also surely situations in which changes in voting behavior
over a decade favor the party that controlled redistricting, regardless
of the fact that the redistricting scheme initially rendered its seats less
secure. But while the passage of time will not always reduce the
effects of partisan gerrymandering, the effects of asymmetrical district
marginality make it likely to do so as a general matter.
History provides many examples of instances where redistricters’
predictions of voting behavior have been inaccurate over time, undermining the intended effects of a new districting scheme. Consider, for
example, the eponymous gerrymander. In 1812, the Jeffersonian legislature of Massachusetts orchestrated a redistricting that split a
county in order to dilute the voting strength of the Federalists. The
resulting district, which resembled a salamander, was described as a
“gerrymander” in honor of the Jeffersonian governor Elbridge Gerry,
who signed the redistricting bill into law. Though the new district was
designed to prevent the Federalists from winning in the next election,
the Jeffersonians’ plan backfired. In the very next election a
76 There is evidence that parties do in fact trade safety for seats when they control the
redistricting process. See, e.g., COX & KATZ, supra note 41, at 51–65; Richard G. Niemi &
Laura R. Winsky, The Persistence of Partisan Redistricting Effects in Congressional
Elections in the 1970s and 1980s, 54 J. POL. 565, 569 (1992).
77 For a theoretical discussion of the extent to which this is possible, see COX & KATZ,
supra note 41, at 37–38.
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Federalist won, having been elected by voters who were supposed not
to be supporters of the Federalists.78 Of course, predictions about
voting behavior are generally not so wrong as to immediately produce
the exact opposite of the intended outcome.79 The immediate unraveling of the partisan gerrymander in Elbridge Gerry’s Massachusetts
does illustrate, however, the uncertainty inherent in partisan
redistricting.
Such rapid reversals aside, there are ready examples of the
undoing of a partisan gerrymander over the course of a decade. Take
New York in the 1970s, for example. Following the 1970 census,
Republicans controlled the redistricting process. The result, according
to Howard Scarrow, was a partisan gerrymander that produced a
strong anti-Democrat bias in the 1972 state assembly and senate elections.80 But the effect of the gerrymander was short-lived:
The most startling story told by the projections, however, is that . . .
changing voting patterns completely undid the careful work of the
Republican cartographers. By 1974 the Assembly districting
scheme had become virtually completely unbiased, and beginning in
1976 it turned against the party which designed it. . . . In the Senate,
too, the effect of gerrymandering wore off . . . .81

To be sure, Scarrow’s conclusions are not entirely unassailable. The
methodology that he uses to estimate partisan bias in each election,
for example, has some shortcomings.82 Still, the experience in New
78 For a general discussion of the 1812 gerrymander in Massachusetts, see, for example,
ELMER C. GRIFFITH, THE RISE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE GERRYMANDER 62–87 (1907).
79 See generally COX & KATZ, supra note 41. If voting behavior were so radically
unpredictable and changes in voting patterns occurred quickly and regularly, attempts at
partisan gerrymandering would inevitably be futile. For another example of such a rapid
reversal, however, consider the post-1980 congressional districts drawn in Indiana. There,
a “Republican partisan gerrymander managed to turn a 6-5 Democratic advantage into a 73 Democratic margin.” BUTLER & CAIN, supra note 7, at 10; see also WILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 164 (3d ed. 2001) (discussing same unintended results of post-1980 Indiana Republican gerrymander).
80 SCARROW, supra note 46, at 108. See generally Howard A. Scarrow, The Impact of
Reapportionment on Party Representation, in REPRESENTATION AND REDISTRICTING
ISSUES 223, 223–36 (Bernard Grofman et al. eds., 1982) (analyzing effect of New York
State Assembly and Senate redistricting in 1970s).
81 SCARROW, supra note 46, at 108.
82 Scarrow estimates bias by calculating hypothetical seat-vote curves for each election
throughout the 1970s. Id. at 105–06. This measure of partisan bias has some weaknesses.
See Richard G. Niemi & Patrick Fett, The Swing Ratio: An Explanation and an
Assessment, 11 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 75, 80–82 (1986). Moreover, Scarrow’s results suggest that
the New York Assembly (though not the Senate) actually became biased in favor of the
Democrats later in the decade. See SCARROW, supra note 46, at 108. This result makes
clear that the passage of time can undermine a party’s efforts to lock-up the political process by means of a partisan gerrymander, but it also suggests that the passage of time will
not always lower the absolute level of partisan bias.
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York provides some additional evidence that the instability of voting
behavior can undermine the effect of partisan gerrymanders over the
course of a decade.
Other, more systematic empirical work provides additional support for the conclusion that the effect of partisan gerrymanders tends
to be ephemeral. Richard Niemi and Laura Winsky’s account of the
effects of congressional districting in the 1970s and 1980s provides
perhaps the most direct evidence. Examining the 1970 and 1980
rounds of congressional redistricting, Niemi and Winsky asked two
questions: first, whether partisan control of redistricting affected the
results of the post-redistricting elections; second, whether those election effects were durable. Analyzing nationwide congressional election returns from throughout the 1970s and 1980s, they concluded that
partisan control does lead to an initial partisan advantage.83 They
found, however, that this initial partisan advantage “typically disappears completely” over time, though “it tends not [to] do so immediately.”84 With respect to congressional districting in the 1980s, for
example, they concluded that “the initial advantage of each party was
held for three successive elections, though there is evidence of a progressive weakening. By 1988, the advantage disappeared altogether,
with each party’s greatest relative gain coming in states controlled by
the other.”85
Again, I should note that one can draw only tentative conclusions
from Niemi and Winsky’s work. There continues to be disagreement
in the political science community about which measures of partisan
bias are meaningful and accurate. There is also some potentially
countervailing evidence in the literature. Gelman and King, for
example, have presented more mixed evidence on the persistence of
the effects of partisan gerrymandering.86 Further empirical work on
the durability of partisan gerrymanders would therefore be useful. As
an initial matter, however, evidence appears to support this essay’s
theoretical prediction that the effect of partisan gerrymanders will
erode over time.
If the uncertainty of voting behavior over time limits the permanence of partisan gerrymanders, then restricting the frequency of
redistricting will promote lower levels of partisan bias in two related
ways. First, such a restriction will straightforwardly lead levels of bias
83

Niemi & Winsky, supra note 76, at 568–69.
Id. at 571.
85 Id. at 570.
86 See generally Gelman & King, supra note 39 (presenting evidence suggesting that
partisan effects of redistricting may be more persistent, but conceptualizing partisan effects
in way quite different than do Niemi and Winsky).
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to decay over the period between redistrictings.87 As a complement,
the restriction will prevent parties in control of the redistricting process from frequently adjusting district boundaries to shore up their
control in districts where their margin of victory has eroded or is otherwise dangerously slim.88
The recent interim redistricting controversy in Colorado provides
a partial example of the legislative adjustments that a prohibition on
off-census-cycle redistricting could prevent. The Colorado congressional districts drawn in the wake of the 2000 census produced an
extremely competitive election. In Colorado’s seventh congressional
district, Republican Bob Beauprez beat Democrat Mike Feeley by a
mere 121 votes—the smallest margin of victory in any congressional
election in 2002.89 In response, the Republican-controlled state government decided to redraw the seventh district following that election
in order to make it safer. Less than sixteen months after the postcensus redistricting plan took effect, the legislature passed a new
redistricting plan that added more than 20,000 likely Republican
voters to the seventh district.90 The Republican governor promptly
signed the bill into law.91
In Texas, interim redistricting efforts may also have been driven
in part by a concern about eroding party control over the course of the
decade. The demographics of the state are shifting rapidly, with the
87 Uncertainty, of course, also may lead some parties in control of the redistricting process to forgo additional partisan advantage in order to retain a certain level of seat safety.
For a discussion of party strategy in the face of uncertainty, see MUSGROVE, supra note 40,
at 29.
88 Or, to put it differently, the prohibition prevents parties from optimizing a partisan
gerrymander over time by regularly shifting district lines.
89 Beauprez received 81,789 votes, and Feeley received 81,668. See OFFICIAL
PUBLICATION OF THE ABSTRACT OF VOTES CAST FOR THE 2001 COORDINATED, 2002
PRIMARY, 2002 GENERAL, at 99, available at http://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/elections/
2002_abstract.pdf (last modified Aug. 7, 2003). The seventh district was designed to be
competitive by the federal court that drew Colorado’s post-2000 districts after the legislature deadlocked. See Avalos v. Davidson, No. 01 CV 2897, 2002 WL 1895406, at *7 (D.
Colo. Jan. 25, 2002) (noting that, as drawn by the court, “[c]ongressional district seven
should be a ‘competitive’ district”).
90 Act of May 9, 2003, ch. 247, 2003 Colo. Sess. Laws 352. In addition, the Republican
redistricting bill shored up the third district, which was also fairly competitive under the
redistricting plan drawn by the state court in 2002. See John C. Ensslin & Karen Abbott,
Challenges Ahead: Redistricting Appeal Could Require Long, Expensive Court Fight,
ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS (Denver), May 8, 2003, at 32A.
91 As explained earlier, the Colorado Supreme Court recently invalidated the redistricting legislation on state constitutional grounds. See supra note 13; People ex rel. Salazar
v. Davidson, 79 P.3d 1221, 1226 (Colo. 2003) (holding that Article V, Section 44 of the
Colorado Constitution “not only requires redistricting after a federal census and before the
ensuing general election, but also restricts the legislature from redistricting at any other
time”), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Colo. Gen. Assembly v. Salazar, 72 U.S.L.W. 3506
(U.S. Jan. 28, 2004) (No. 03-1082).
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percentage of Hispanic voters in the state rising rapidly. At least one
commentator has suggested that concern about the electoral consequences of this population growth partly fueled Republican desires to
redraw congressional districts that were less than two years old: “The
Republicans are reading the tea leaves and saying well, we think this is
inexorable, we better act now before the scales tip and this demographic breaks against us.”92
In short, limiting the frequency of redistricting should help lessen
the effects of partisan gerrymandering and prevent parties from combating their eroding advantage. In this way, a temporal floor on the
redistricting process will promote, if only in part, the self-limiting
aspect of partisan gerrymandering that is a product of the seats-safety
tradeoff. Justice O’Connor emphasized this self-limitation when she
dissented from the Court’s conclusion in Davis v. Bandemer that constitutional challenges to partisan gerrymandering were justiciable.
She stressed that, “[i]n order to gerrymander, the legislative majority
must weaken some of its safe seats, thus exposing its own incumbents
to greater risk of defeat . . . . [A]n overambitious gerrymander can
[therefore] lead to disaster for the legislative majority . . . .”93 As the
preceding discussion shows, however, this self-limitation is much
weaker where parties are free to redistrict frequently. Because the
uncertainty that drives the limitation is a function of time, a restriction
on the frequency of redistricting should help ensure that the self-limitation is more real than apparent.
2. Randomization and Agenda Regularization
There is a second, related feature of a rule limiting redistricting to
a once-a-decade activity that should also promote lower levels of partisan bias. Such a frequency limitation, taken in conjunction with the
existing temporal ceiling on the redistricting process, would further
regularize the timing of redistricting. By taking agenda-setting power
away from state political actors and partially randomizing control over
the redistricting process, this regularization should lessen the likelihood that redistricting will occur under conditions favoring partisan
gerrymandering.94
92 Todd J. Gillman, GOP Draws a Line in the Land, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 8,
2003, at 12A (quoting Antonio González, president of William C. Velásquez Institute);
accord id. (“‘Now is the last great opportunity for the Republicans to maximize gains . . .
[by 2010] you just won’t have enough to work with.’”) (quoting Dr. Richard Murray, political scientist at University of Houston).
93 Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 152 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
94 In contrast to the previous discussion, which focused on the temporal effects of partisan gerrymandering and on the redistricting calculus of a party in control of the decennial
redistricting process, this section focuses on the control that parties-in-government actually
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As political scientists have noted, the severity of partisan gerrymanders (or, to be more precise, the extent of partisan bias produced
by redistricting) is a function of the degree to which one political party
or the other controls the redistricting process.95 In most states, redistricting is accomplished through the ordinary legislative process.96
There are a variety of different possible configurations of control over
that process, stemming from the fact that all states but one have
bicameral legislatures,97 as well as from the fact that most states grant
the governor a veto over ordinary legislation.98 A party-in-government can thus control one, two, or all three of these branches of the
legislative process.99
The extent to which a party-in-government can secure its preferred redistricting outcome from the legislative process depends on
the party’s degree of control over that process. Given that parties
prefer, all other things equal, redistricting outcomes that bias the district map in their favor, one would expect the extent of partisan bias
produced by the redistricting process to depend on whether redistricting takes place under unitary or divided control. This prediction
has been confirmed in practice. Gary Cox and Jonathan Katz, among
others, have shown that the degree of partisan bias produced by redistricting is a function of the partisan control of state government.100
When a party has unitary control over redistricting, the resulting district map tends to be more biased than a map drawn under divided
control.101
have over the redistricting process, as well as what that control means for when off-censuscycle redistricting is most likely to occur.
95 Cf. COX & KATZ, supra note 41, at 31–43 (explaining that degree of bias produced
by redistricting is in part function of extent to which one party controls state government).
96 As noted above, however, some states delegate redistricting authority to bipartisan
or nonpartisan commissions. See supra text accompanying note 28; see also infra note 151
(providing examples of states that shift state legislative districting to commissions).
97 Nebraska has a unicameral legislature. See NEB. CONST. art. III, § 1.
98 At least one state specifically denies its governor a veto over redistricting legislation.
See N.C. CONST. art. II, § 22. Relatedly, some state constitutions provide that a simple
majority of the legislature can override a gubernatorial veto. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. V,
§ 125; ARK. CONST. art. VI, § 15; KY. CONST. § 88.
99 “Control” over a branch of the state legislature can sometimes mean more than
simply constituting a majority of that branch; cloture requirements or other supermajority
voting rules sometimes make effective control more difficult. See, e.g., CONN. CONST. art.
III, § 6 (requiring vote of two-thirds of membership of each legislative house to pass redistricting legislation). Control is also complicated by the fact that a party-in-government is
seldom completely cohesive.
100 See COX & KATZ, supra note 41, at 31–50.
101 Note that the lower levels of bias produced by divided governments are the product
of two processes: bargaining between the parties where the parties do eventually reach
agreement, and less-biased judicial redistricting where the state parties deadlock. See
BUTLER & CAIN, supra note 7, at 107–11.
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This conclusion is important because redistricting outside the
decennial cycle is more likely than post-census redistricting to occur
under unitary control. Redistricting following the census occurs under
partially randomized conditions of control. States redistrict at that
time because they must do so in order to bring their districting maps
into compliance with the one person, one vote mandate; they are not
redistricting by choice. Because states do not control the timing of
decennial redistricting,102 political parties cannot manipulate redistricting timing in an effort to ensure that they control the line-drawing
process.103 Consequently, control over decennial redistricting is partially randomized. As a result, decennial redistricting will frequently
take place under divided control—a circumstance that, as noted
above, favors lower levels of partisan bias.
In the absence of a rule requiring redistricting, states are unlikely
to redraw district lines unless their governments are under unitary
control. This is because one party can block redistricting in situations
of divided control.104 That party need only prevent the assent of one
arm of the legislative process in order to block the enactment of redistricting legislation.105 History bears out the fact that redistricting is far
102 States generally must redistrict between the time that federal census data becomes
available and the primary season for the next general election. See Growe v. Emison, 507
U.S. 25, 35–37 (1993) (noting that “the District Court would have been justified in
adopting its own plan if it had been apparent that the state court . . . would not develop a
redistricting plan in time for the primaries”); cf. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 585 (1964)
(“[O]nce a State’s legislative apportionment scheme has been found to be unconstitutional,
it would be the unusual case in which a court would be justified in not taking appropriate
action to insure that no further elections are conducted under the invalid plan.”). But cf.
French v. Boner, Nos. 91-5811, 91-5875, 1991 WL 151016, at *1 (6th Cir. Aug. 8, 1991)
(permitting city council election under obsolete districts where census data became available only few months before scheduled date for election); ME. CONST. art. IV, pt. 1, § 2
(requiring that state’s house districts be redrawn by “[t]he Legislature which convenes in
1983 and every tenth year thereafter”); id. art. IV, pt. 2, § 2 (requiring same for senate
districts). The Census Act, 13 U.S.C. §§ 1–401 (2000), requires that census population data
be provided to states for redistricting purposes no later than April 1 of the year following
the census. See 13 U.S.C. § 141(c) (2000).
103 Of course, this does not preclude the possibility that parties will expend resources in
order to increase the likelihood that they will control at least one branch of state government in order to influence post-census districting outcomes. See BUTLER & CAIN, supra
note 7, at 2 (noting that “Republicans in the 1990 elections put extra resources into the
gubernatorial races in Florida, Texas, and California, hoping to block the Democrat-controlled legislatures from enacting partisan redistrictings”).
104 As the Framers noted with respect to the structure of the federal government,
dividing legislative authority among several institutions generally makes it more difficult to
pass legislation. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 73 (Alexander Hamilton). That point is,
of course, a corollary to the point that the degree of control over the legislative process is
related to the extent to which one party can secure preferred outcomes from that process.
105 In states where the upper legislative house has a supermajority voting rule of some
kind, the minority party need not even constitute a majority in any part of state government to deadlock the legislative process.
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less likely to occur when control of the state government is divided.106
This fact is also confirmed by current practice: Even now, when constitutional law spurs states to undertake redistricting following each
census, the legislative process sometimes deadlocks in states that are
under divided control, leading a court to fashion district lines itself.107
Deadlock is much less likely in states under unitary control immediately following the decennial census.
Off-census-cycle redistricting—which is a matter of legislative
choice—is therefore likely to happen only when a state’s government
is under unitary control.108 Accordingly, the interim redistricting process is more likely than the decennial districting process to take place
under circumstances favoring high levels of bias. A rule prohibiting
redistricting more than once each decade prevents this result.109 By
fully regularizing redistricting timing, such a rule strips state partiesin-government of the power to set the redistricting agenda. This
makes it less likely that districting plans will be drawn under conditions of unitary control, which in turn should curtail the effects of partisan gerrymandering.110
In addition to showing how a procedural rule that prohibits redistricting outside the decennial cycle should curtail partisan gerrymandering, the preceding analysis demonstrates that it would be a mistake
to adopt a rule that some of the political actors in the recent redis106 See Erik J. Engstrom, How Party Competition Constructs Democracy: Strategic
Redistricting and American Electoral Development, ch. 3, at 8 (2003) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of California, San Diego) (on file with author) (“Between 1840 and
1940, only twice did a state, unprompted by a [change in the number of that state’s congressional seats], redistrict when there was divided partisan control.”).
107 This is, in fact, precisely what occurred in both Texas and Colorado following the
release of the 2000 census data. See Keller v. Davidson, 299 F. Supp. 2d 1171, 1174 (D.
Colo. 2004) (Colorado); Halbfinger, supra note 6 (Texas).
108 The interim redistricting controversies in Colorado and Texas bear out this point—
both states are under unitary Republican control. To be precise, it is possible that, for riskaverse parties, there are potentially mutually beneficial changes to district lines that the
parties could agree to even under conditions of divided government. See COX & KATZ,
supra note 41, at 39–41. Such a bargain, however, would likely increase bias (while
reducing responsiveness), so the possibility of such a bargain does not undermine the principal point that off-cycle redistrictings are more likely to occur under conditions that favor
high levels of bias than post-census redistrictings.
109 This conclusion also points out why it is especially beneficial to impose a temporal
floor that is identical to the temporal ceiling. Any temporal floor will take away some
agenda-setting authority from the more powerful party-in-government, but a temporal
floor that butts up against the temporal ceiling strips the state of all agenda-setting
authority by fully regularizing the redistricting cycle.
110 In some ways, a prohibition on interim redistricting is therefore a randomization rule
not unlike those suggested intermittently in the political science literature. See, e.g.,
Gelman & King, supra note 39, at 554 (suggesting that “alternating, or randomly assigned,
control of redistricting” would help reduce level of partisan bias over time).
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tricting fights have argued for. In Texas, Governor Perry and other
Republicans suggested publicly that while decennial redistricting
should be the norm, an additional round of redistricting is imperative
where a court rather than the state legislature has drawn the initial
post-census district map.111 As a legal matter, Governor Perry and
others have suggested that federal law obligates the state legislature to
redraw congressional districts and that the legislature is not relieved
of this duty by the fact that a court has already fashioned constitutional district lines.112
The Texas Republicans’ legal argument is flat wrong. Federal law
does not obligate state legislatures to redistrict following each census.
While the one person, one vote jurisprudence does require that legislative districts be redrawn following the decennial census to correct
for demographic changes, it nowhere suggests that only districts
drawn by state legislatures can satisfy the constitutional requirement.
To the contrary, the Supreme Court’s case law specifically authorizes
federal courts to redraw district maps that states fail to update.113 In
other words, the one person, one vote standard is internally indifferent to the institutional source of district lines; all that matters is that
election districts be revised regularly in compliance with the equipopulation principle.
That is not to say that constitutional law is entirely unconcerned
with which institution undertakes redistricting. The Court has repeatedly emphasized that redistricting is primarily the responsibility of
each state.114 This principle requires that federal courts give states the
111 See R.G. Ratcliffe, Both Sides Believe Time is Their Ally, HOUSTON CHRON., Aug.
17, 2003, at 1A (quoting interview with Governor Perry).
112 See Halbfinger, supra note 6 (“[Texas Republicans, including Governor Perry] say
that although the Constitution requires the legislature to draw district boundaries, the current map was drawn by a panel of federal judges.”). This legal argument in favor of offcycle redistricting has been made by other Republicans, including Tom DeLay. See, e.g.,
Ed Quillen, Gerrymander Could Backfire on GOP, DENVER POST, May 11, 2003, at 6E
(Colorado Senator John Andrews); see also Carl Hulse, Tom DeLay Stars in Texas
Donnybrook, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2003, at A26; Joshua Micah Marshall, Oh That’s
Classic, TALKING POINTS MEMO, Aug. 18, 2003 (quoting DeLay as saying that Texas state
legislature has federal constitutional obligation to redraw Texas’s congressional districts
because court drew post-2000 census district lines), at http://talkingpointsmemo.com/
aug0303.html.
113 See, e.g., Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 36–37 (1993); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
533, 586–87 (1964); cf. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 237 (1962) (holding justiciable claim
that legislative reapportionment violated Equal Protection Clause, even though relief in
future cases would likely involve judicial fashioning of constitutional district lines); id. at
259–61 (Clark, J., concurring) (suggesting that appropriate remedy would be for courts to
revise unconstitutional district lines).
114 See, e.g., Growe, 507 U.S. at 33–35; Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 27 (1975); White
v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 794–95 (1973); Scott v. Germano, 381 U.S. 407, 409 (1965) (per
curiam); Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 586–87. The Court has not been particularly explicit about
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opportunity to redistrict before drawing district lines themselves. But
the requirement that federal courts defer in the first instance to states
does not entail the conclusion that only state legislatures are empowered to redistrict, or that a legislature is obligated to undertake redistricting even after another institution already has drawn valid districts.
Rather, the redistricting jurisprudence simply provides a sequence for
the redistricting process, leaving redistricting initially to states and
limiting federal courts to a backup role.115 (And importantly, the
term “state” in this case law specifically includes the state judiciary,
not just the state legislature.116) Nothing in the redistricting jurisprudence mandates the legislative redrawing of valid districts fashioned
by a state or federal court.
Legal unpersuasiveness aside, it would be a bad idea, from the
perspective of preventing partisan gerrymandering, to permit or promote interim redistricting in situations where a court drew a state’s
post-census district lines. Court-ordered redistricting plans are generally the product of legislative deadlock, and deadlock most frequently
occurs where the state government is under divided control.117 For
this reason, as well as because courts (particularly federal courts) tend
to be less partisan than other actors involved in redistricting, districting plans drawn by courts following legislative deadlock are likely
to have low levels of bias. In contrast, legislative revision of a courtfashioned plan is almost certain to occur only, as it did in Colorado

which constitutional basis leaves to states the primary authority for redrawing their congressional and state legislative districts. See, e.g., Growe, 507 U.S. at 32 (suggesting “federalism and comity” as bases); id. at 34 (suggesting that Article I, Section 2 of Constitution
supports principle); Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 586 (setting forth principle without providing
specific basis for it). While Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution seems a likely constitutional basis for federal court deference in the congressional redistricting context, see U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 4 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and
Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof . . . .”); infra
notes 145–148 and accompanying text, the Court does not appear ever to have relied on
that basis.
115 See Growe, 507 U.S. at 33; Germano, 381 U.S. at 409.
116 See Growe, 507 U.S. at 34; Germano, 381 U.S. at 409.
117 This is not always true because, unlike federal courts, state courts are free as a matter
of federal law to undertake redistricting without waiting to see whether the state legislative
process produces a districting plan. Nonetheless, state law sometimes requires state courts
to defer to the legislative process (either temporally or altogether), and state courts usually
defer even when not clearly required to do so by state law. See, e.g., LeRoux v. Sec’y of
State, 640 N.W.2d 849, 863 (Mich. 2002) (“[C]ourts should only intervene when the
Legislature has failed to perform its [redistricting] function in a constitutional manner.”);
Mauldin v. Branch, No. 2002-CA-00146-SCT, 2003 WL 22966144, at *3–*4 (Miss. Dec. 18,
2003) (holding that state courts have no power ever to redraw congressional districts
because state law vests that power exclusively in legislature).
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and Texas, under conditions of unitary control that favor higher levels
of partisan bias.118
***
In short, a temporal floor on redistricting promotes political fairness by augmenting the uncertainty inherent in the redistricting process and by partially randomizing political control over that process.
This does not mean that prohibiting redistricting more than once each
decennial census cycle is sufficient to prevent all normatively objectionable levels of political unfairness in redistricting systems; nor will
it necessarily prevent every instance of gerrymandering that the Court
might find objectionable under the constitutional standard it articulated in Davis v. Bandemer. Nonetheless, this procedural restriction
should have an important dampening effect on partisan gerrymandering. This conclusion is important both for its own sake and
because it highlights the need to pay careful attention to the ways in
which the procedural regulation of the redistricting process may affect
the political fairness of districted elections.
C. The Potential Collateral Effects of
Limiting Redistricting Frequency
A rule prohibiting redistricting more than once each decade
could potentially give rise to a few costs. The first (and most obvious)
potential downside is that a frequency limitation might increase partisan fairness at the expense of the one person, one vote principle. A
second potential concern is that a temporal floor might lead to less
competitive elections. This Section explains why neither of these concerns is well-founded.
1. Demographic Change and the Principle of One Person, One Vote
While the Supreme Court requires states to create equipopulous
districts following each census, those districts do not remain equipopulous throughout the decade. Due to demographic changes, dis118 Cf. COX & KATZ, supra note 41, at 38–50 (presenting proof of analogous point in
context of pre-Baker redistricting outcomes). Note that a rule prohibiting interim redistricting except where post-census district lines are drawn by the judiciary could also have
perverse effects on the incentives for legislators to bargain in the initial round of redistricting. In a state under divided control, a party anticipating that it might gain complete
control of the legislative process following the next election cycle would be less likely to
bargain over initial post-census district lines if its power to revise those lines were contingent upon the initial lines having been drawn by a court rather than by the legislature. Cf.
Halbfinger, supra note 6 (suggesting that Texas Republicans refused to bargain in post2000 census round of redistricting because they expected that state legislature was about to
swing to Republican control).
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tricts inevitably deviate from population equality as time passes. One
potentially negative effect of a limitation on the frequency of redistricting is that it would prohibit frequent refashioning of district lines
to correct these deviations.119
While this implication of a temporal floor on redistricting is
important to acknowledge, it is likely to be of little practical or normative significance. First, there are legal reasons why, even absent a limitation on the frequency of redistricting, states are unlikely to adjust
district lines throughout the decade to equalize district populations.
To correct for population shifts throughout a decade, a state would
need information about those shifts. Accordingly, it would need to
redraw district lines using data from something other than the federal
decennial census. As a matter of federal law, it is unclear whether
states could rely on other such data to draw districts. While the text of
the Constitution does not require states to use the decennial census
for redistricting purposes,120 the Supreme Court has held that redistricting, at least for Congress, must be undertaken with “the best
census data available” in order to comply with the “Constitution’s
ideal of equal representation.”121 The Court has never confronted the
question of what constitutes the best available census data as a consti119 To be clear, this concern is not a constitutional one. As I pointed out earlier, the
Supreme Court only attempts to guarantee one person, one vote at the time of the census,
not throughout the decade. See Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 123 S. Ct. 2498, 2516 n.2
(2003) (“When the decennial census numbers are released, States must redistrict to
account for any changes or shifts in population. But before the new census, States operate
under the legal fiction that even 10 years later, the plans are constitutionally apportioned.”); Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 732 (1983) (acknowledging that “the wellknown restlessness of the American people” means that census data quickly becomes outdated, but requiring redistricting only based on census data); Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 583
(“[A]lthough undoubtedly reapportioning no more frequently than every 10 years leads to
some imbalance in the population of districts toward the end of the decennial period . . . we
do not regard the Equal Protection Clause as requiring daily, monthly, annual or biennial
reapportionment . . . .”).
120 Article I, Section 4 does appear to require that members of Congress be apportioned
among the states on the basis of the decennial census, but it does not speak to redistricting.
Federal statutory law also speaks only to apportionment: As interpreted by the Court, the
Census Act prohibits the use of sampling in the census for purposes of apportioning seats
among the states. See Dep’t of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316,
339–40 (1999) (interpreting 13 U.S.C. §§ 1–401). Federal statutory law does not limit the
data sources on which states can rely for state legislative or congressional redistricting.
121 Karcher, 462 U.S. at 731; see also Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 532 (1969)
(noting that Missouri had failed to minimize population variances between districts in part
because it had “relied on inaccurate data in constructing the districts”). In the context of
state legislative redistricting, the Court stated soon after Reynolds was decided that “the
Equal Protection Clause does not require the States to use total population figures derived
from the federal census as the standard by which . . . substantial population equivalency is
to be measured.” Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 91 (1966).
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tutional matter,122 but it is conceivable that the Court would not
permit states to rely on extrapolations from the decennial census or
other sources of interim population information.123 That said, such a
holding would be odd, given that the Supreme Court in Reynolds took
pains not to prohibit states from redistricting more than once every
ten years.124
Regardless of the status of federal law, however, many states
have constitutional or statutory provisions that require them to use
federal decennial census figures for all districting.125 For these states,
revising district lines throughout a decade to achieve population
equality would be a pointless exercise because they would have to rely
on the same census figures for each revision—that is, unless they
simultaneously repealed or modified their constitutional or statutory
provisions to permit the use of extrapolated census figures or other
updated demographic information.
Even putting aside the ways in which existing legal regulation of
the redistricting process might preclude more frequent boundary
adjustment to correct for population shifts, there is little reason to
think that the costs of precluding such adjustment are sufficiently
great to forego the benefits of a temporal redistricting floor. History
and present practice demonstrate that states have little inclination to
undertake redistricting in order to correct for demographic shifts.
Before the Supreme Court constitutionalized the requirement of regular redistricting, states frequently declined to adjust district boundaries to compensate for stark population shifts.126 This was true even
122 See Nathaniel Persily, 2000 Census Data: New Format and New Challenges, in THE
REAL Y2K PROBLEM: CENSUS 2000 DATA AND REDISTRICTING TECHNOLOGY 1, 14
(Nathaniel Persily ed., 2000).
123 See BUTLER & CAIN, supra note 7, at 56 (noting Supreme Court’s skepticism of use
of data other than federal census, and that state using projected data “would open itself up
to legal challenge”).
124 Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 584 (“And we do not mean to intimate that more frequent
reapportionment would not be constitutionally permissible or practicably desirable.”).
125 See, e.g., N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 2 (“The Senate shall be composed of forty senators
apportioned among Senate districts as nearly as may be according to the number of their
inhabitants as reported in the last preceding decennial census of the United States . . . .”);
N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 4 (“[T]he federal census taken in the year nineteen hundred thirty
and each federal census taken decennially thereafter shall be controlling as to the number
of inhabitants in the state or any part thereof for the purposes of the apportionment of
members of assembly and readjustment or alteration of senate and assembly districts next
occurring . . . .”).
126 See, e.g., ROBERT G. DIXON, JR., DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION: REAPPORTIONMENT IN LAW AND POLITICS 84 (1968) (“A survey in 1960 showed that 12 state senates and
also 12 lower houses had not been reapportioned for thirty years or more.”); see also
Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 569–70 (“At the time this litigation was commenced, there had been
no reapportionment of seats in the Alabama Legislature for over 60 years.”); Wesberry v.
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though forty-one states had constitutional or statutory provisions
requiring the reallocation of legislative seats every ten years.127 These
legal requirements were simply ignored.128 Moreover, there is no evidence that the reapportionment revolution changed anything. Since
Baker v. Carr, no state has voluntarily revised its state legislative or
congressional districts between the decennial districting cycle in order
to provide greater population equality. Even in the recent interim
redistrictings that took place in Colorado and Texas, the state legislatures based the revised district lines on the same 2000 census figures
used for the initial post-census redistrictings.129 Consequently, the
trade-off between population equality and partisan fairness that a
redistricting floor potentially imposes is nonexistent in practice.
Of course, if merely permitting states to adjust districts more frequently to correct for population inequalities has no effect, the federal
government or the states could require, rather than just permit, more
frequent redistricting in order to correct for population shifts. Thus,
one could argue that it is best to compare a world in which more frequent redistricting is prohibited with a world where such redistricting
is required, rather than simply permitted by the absence of a frequency
limitation.130 Which rule is preferable depends to a great extent on
whether the goal of obtaining strict population equality or curbing
partisan gerrymandering is more important. While this choice is in
part a normative one, it is a choice about which there is general agreement in the literature. The legal and political scholarship on redistricting and representation consistently concludes that, as both a
theoretical and practical matter, the promotion of politically fair districting is more important than perfecting population equality.131
Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 2 (1964) (noting that Georgia’s congressional districts had last been
redrawn in 1931).
127 Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 583.
128 See, e.g., Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 5 (1975) (“An apportionment effected by
Laws 1931 was in effect for over 30 years despite the mandate of § 35 of the Constitution
that apportionment be effected after each federal census.”) (citation omitted); Reynolds,
377 U.S. at 540 (“[T]he last apportionment of the Alabama Legislature was based on the
1900 federal census, despite the requirement of the State Constitution that the legislature
be reapportioned decennially.”).
129 See Act of May 9, 2003, ch. 247, 2003 Colo. Sess. Laws 352; Act of Oct. 13, 2003, ch.
2, 2003 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3 (Vernon).
130 There are, or have been, a few states that have required more frequent redistricting.
See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 583 n.65 (noting that, according to Report of the Advisory
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Apportionment of State Legislatures 56
(1962), constitutions of seven states either required or permitted reapportionment more
frequently than every ten years).
131 See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 17, at 112, 131–34; cf. Gerken, supra note 38, at 1437
(criticizing Court’s treatment of strict population equality as an “end unto itself rather than
a means for achieving a well-functioning democracy”); Pildes, supra note 38, at 1608 (criti-

R
R

\\server05\productn\N\NYU\79-3\NYU301.txt

786

unknown

Seq: 36

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

1-JUL-04

9:31

[Vol. 79:751

2. Partisan Bias v. Electoral Responsiveness
One also might criticize a limitation on the frequency of redistricting on the ground that it simply trades lower partisan bias for
reduced electoral responsiveness. In an SMP electoral system, partisan bias is correlated with electoral responsiveness—where electoral
responsiveness is the degree to which the partisan composition of the
legislature responds to partisan changes in voting behavior over
time.132 In order to introduce partisan bias into a districting scheme,
the party in control of redistricting generally is forced to make districts that it controls less secure and therefore more responsive to
changes in the voting behavior of the electorate.133 Because both bias
and responsiveness are normatively significant, a redistricting regulation that lowers bias is not necessarily an improvement if it simultaneously lowers responsiveness.
A limitation on the frequency of redistricting, however, does not
just trade increased partisan fairness for reduced electoral responsiveness. Instead it makes the trade-off between bias and responsiveness
more real: A floor on redistricting makes it more difficult to secure
simultaneously the same level of bias and unresponsiveness that could
be obtained in the absence of the floor. This is because the expected
margin of victory that a party must build into a seat to make it safe in
the next election is less than the margin that it must build in to make
the seat safe over the course of a decade. Thus, to achieve the same
level of nonresponsiveness (safety) that it could in the absence of a
frequency limitation on redistricting, a party generally will have to
lower the initial level of bias. Reciprocally, to achieve the same level
of initial bias, the party generally must accept greater responsiveness
(and less seat security) over the course of the decade.
Political parties in control of the redistricting process inevitably
must make decisions about how to balance the goal of introducing
partisan bias against the goal of creating safe—that is, nonresponsive—districts. But assuming that legislators’ level of risk aversion
cizing Court’s push towards perfecting population equality in Karcher v. Daggett on ground
that “the organizational and structural stakes in certain contexts of rights claims dwarf the
individual interests asserted”). In fact, highlighting the potential trade-off between normative commitments to population equality and political fairness raises another question not
considered in the current literature: whether decennial redistricting is too frequent.
132 See Gelman & King, supra note 39, at 543. This correlation stems from the fact that
a party must increase the marginality of its districts in order to introduce bias into the
system. See supra Part II.A.2. This increased marginality makes those districts more competitive (in the sense that expected margins of victory are smaller) and, as a result, more
responsive to changes in voter partisanship.
133 As noted earlier, this is because the party must increase the marginality of its districts. See supra Part II.A; see also COX & KATZ, supra note 41, at 37–38.
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stays the same, limiting the frequency of redistricting should lower the
level of partisan bias without affecting the level of responsiveness.
And even if the legislators’ feelings about the relative importance of
bias and safety did change, a temporal floor on redistricting should
lower the aggregate level of bias and safety. Thus, one need not
commit to a particular relationship between these two electoral features in order to justify such a floor.
D. Regulatory Irrelevance?
Finally, there is the question of whether a legally imposed temporal floor on redistricting is necessary. Since Baker v. Carr’s progeny
first required redistricting following each census, it appears that no
state has successfully undertaken the interim revision of valid congressional or state legislative districts—that is, until last spring.134 One
might ask, therefore, whether the off-cycle redistricting efforts in
Colorado and elsewhere are an aberration that needs no regulatory
response. Relatedly, one might ask why, if interim redistricting can
increase the power of partisan gerrymanders, the practice did not
occur in the first several districting cycles following Baker.135
It is extremely difficult, of course, to predict whether a new political dynamic marks an emerging practice or merely an anomaly.
There are reasons to suspect, however, that off-census cycle redistricting is unlikely to disappear as a possible state practice. The
interim redistricting battles began last year in Colorado and Texas, but
134 See Juliet Eilperin, GOP’s New Push on Redistricting, WASH. POST, May 9, 2003, at
A4; Hulse, supra note 112; see also Fred Brown, Three Days of Bad Precedents, DENVER
POST, May 11, 2003, at 6E. Redistricting more than once each decade did occur earlier in
the country’s history, however, particularly in the latter part of the nineteenth century. See
Engstrom, supra note 106, ch. 3, at 2, 7, 32–34 (2003) (noting that “Ohio, for example,
redistricted seven times between 1878 and 1892”); see also Kris Axtman, Redistricting: The
Wars Get More Frequent, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 29, 2003, at 2 (stating that more
frequent redistricting occurred in Washington in 1950s and Ohio in 1880s).
135 One also might ask whether the political parties could effectively curtail the practice
of interim redistricting, without legal regulation, by engaging in tit-for-tat retaliation whenever one of the parties undertakes interim redistricting. See generally JAMES D. MORROW,
GAME THEORY FOR POLITICAL SCIENTISTS 264–66 (1994) (explaining parameters of tit-fortat game). At least one crucial reason why tit-for-tat retaliation is extremely unlikely to
work is that a party usually will not be able to retaliate (at least in the near term) when the
other party engages in interim redistricting. As explained above, such redistricting is likely
to occur only when one party has unified control over the state legislative process. But if
one party has such control and engages in interim redistricting, it is unlikely that all three
branches of the state legislative process will shift into the hands of the other party in short
order. With respect to state legislative redistricting, this shift in control of the legislative
process is made even less likely by the fact that the legislature is drawing district lines that
help determine its own composition. Consequently, the bias that interim redistricting
introduces further lowers the likelihood that the party disfavored by the redistricting will
quickly be able to gain complete control of the legislative process in order to retaliate.
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it appears that they may spread to other states. Georgia Republicans
have stated that they favor redrawing that state’s fresh congressional
districts.136 Republicans in Ohio also have indicated that interim
redistricting may be in the offing.137 And now that the possibility of
more frequent district revision is part of the political landscape, it
seems unlikely that parties will forget about the advantages that they
can gain from the practice.138
Moreover, the previous absence of interim redistricting does not
undermine this possibility. As with predicting the future, explaining
the past is not an easy task. Even a quick look back, however, suggests a few reasons why more frequent redistricting may not have
emerged more quickly in the post-Baker world, and why the practice
may well continue. First, the Democratic Party’s previous dominance
in the House of Representatives may have made interim redistricting
much less attractive in the past. From the time of the reapportionment revolution through the early 1990s, Democrats regularly enjoyed
wide margins of control over the House.139 Under those conditions,
any seats gained through interim redistricting would have done little
to alter the balance of power in Congress. Today, however, the
Republican Party has only a very thin margin of control in the
House.140 Given the relative partisan parity in the House, interim
redistricting now offers a much greater potential payoff. The six or
seven seats that commentators predict the Republican Party will gain
as a result of re-redistricting in Texas, for example, may be crucial to
that party’s efforts to retain control over Congress in the next few
election cycles.
Second, it may simply be that it took time for political actors to
become attuned, following the reapportionment revolution, to the
potential benefits of redrawing legislative districts more than once per
decennial census cycle. Similar sorts of time lags have occurred with
respect to other aspects of election regulation. The use of soft money
136

See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
See supra note 6.
138 Cf. Halbfinger, supra note 6 (noting that “amped-up partisanship . . . could soon
make redistricting battles a recurring feature of the political landscape . . . reviving the 19th
century practice of redrawing political maps every time a legislature changed hands”); John
William, Redistricting Fight Spilling Over, HOUSTON CHRON., May 16, 2003, at A36
(“Democrats argue that [Tom] DeLay is setting the precedent for continual efforts to gain
advantage in the U.S. House through redistricting every time party control changes in the
state legislature.”).
139 See CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY’S GUIDE TO CONGRESS 1095–96 (5th ed. 2000)
(listing division of power in House over time).
140 See OFFICE OF THE FED. REGISTER, NAT’L ARCHIVES & RECORDS ADMIN., THE
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT MANUAL 2003/2004, at 34 (rev. 2003) (stating that House is
currently composed of 229 Republicans, 205 Democrats, and one Independent).
137
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by political parties to fund issue ads, for example, arguably has been
permissible since Buckley v. Valeo.141 Not until the mid-nineties, however, did the Democrats and Republicans seize on this possibility and
broadcast tens of millions of dollars worth of such ads.142
Finally, the appearance of off-census cycle redistricting may be
evidence of greater party discipline. The interests of incumbents and
political parties diverge to some extent when it comes to redrawing
district lines.143 Incumbents typically want their districts preserved
wherever possible, and they generally want whatever changes are
made to increase the safety of their seats. It is in the party’s interest,
however, to trade off some seat security for the possibility of winning
greater control of the legislature. Greater party discipline might thus
enable a party to pursue off-cycle redistricting efforts that otherwise
would be blocked by self-interested incumbents. Recent events provide some anecdotal evidence that the national Republican Party has
played a significant role in prodding state interim redistricting efforts.
Tom DeLay, a Republican congressman from Texas, reportedly
spearheaded the redistricting effort in Texas and played a central role
in fashioning that state’s new districting plan.144 Moreover, several
reports suggest that White House adviser Karl Rove helped coordinate the district revision process in Colorado, Texas, and possibly
Ohio, with an eye toward shoring up the Republican Party’s hold on
the House of Representatives in the 2004 election.
These suggestions are, of course, a bit speculative, and it is well
beyond the scope of this essay to explain fully the emergence of the
new political dynamic prompting off-cycle redistricting efforts. Nonetheless, there are reasons to suspect that last year’s flurry of interim
redistricting is not just an anomaly.
III
THE POTENTIAL INSTITUTIONAL SOURCES
OF A TEMPORAL FLOOR ON REDISTRICTING
While a limitation on the frequency of redistricting may have
141

424 U.S. 1 (1976).
See generally Richard Briffault, The Political Parties and Campaign Finance Reform,
100 COLUM. L. REV. 620 (2000).
143 See COX & KATZ, supra note 41, at 18–19.
144 See Jeffrey Toobin, The Great Election Grab; When Does Gerrymandering Become a
Threat to Democracy?, NEW YORKER, Dec. 8, 2003, at 63–64; Dave McNeely, Redistricting
Ground Swell is Missing, AUSTIN AM. STATESMAN, Apr. 24, 2003, at B1 (noting that
DeLay supposedly engineered map). Early reports also indicated that some Republican
members of the Texas state legislature were not in favor of revising that state’s fresh congressional districts, further suggesting that party discipline played a role in advancing the
efforts. See McNeely, supra.
142
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beneficial effects, there remains the question of whether and how such
a restriction could be imposed on the congressional and state legislative redistricting process. This Part first discusses the existing landscape of redistricting regulatory authority for the states and Congress.
It then speculates about whether federal courts could plausibly prohibit interim redistricting as a matter of federal constitutional law.
A. The States
States have authority to limit the frequency of redistricting for
both state legislative and congressional elections. In fact, some states
already have. Examining these existing regulations, however, suggests
a few reasons why states might not be particularly effective at fully
regularizing the timing of their own redistricting processes.
That states have initial authority to regulate their nonfederal elections is unsurprising, given our federal structure. As a constitutional
matter, states also have some authority to control the timing of congressional redistricting. Article I, Section 4 of the Federal
Constitution (typically referred to as the Elections Clause) grants
states initial authority to regulate virtually all aspects of congressional
elections. That section provides: “The Times, Places and Manner of
holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may
at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the
Places of chusing Senators.”145
While it might be possible to argue that redistricting rules
somehow do not constitute regulations of the manner of elections,
both history and case law make clear that the Election Clause’s initial
grant of authority to states includes the power to regulate redistricting. During the Constitutional Convention, for example, Madison
stated that the Elections Clause would leave it up to states to decide in
the first instance
[w]hether the electors [for members of the House of
Representatives] should vote by ballot or vivâ voce, should
assemble at this place or that place; should be divided into districts
or all meet at one place; shd [sic] all vote for all the representatives;
or all in a district vote for a number allotted to the district . . . .146

The debates in the ratifying conventions contain similar statements
indicating that state authority under Article I, Section 4 included the
145

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4.
2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 240 (Max Farrand ed.,
1911), quoted in Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 32 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
146
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power to regulate congressional districting.147 And founding-era history aside, subsequent Supreme Court cases repeatedly assume that
redistricting regulations constitute time, place, or manner regulations
of elections, emphasizing that the regulation of congressional redistricting is principally the responsibility of states.148
With respect to both state legislative and congressional elections,
therefore, states have initial authority to regulate redistricting. Like
other areas of state regulatory authority, of course, state power is
potentially subject to federal restrictions—both constitutional and
statutory. As a constitutional matter, there is nothing that would prohibit states from limiting redistricting efforts for state legislative or
congressional elections to a once-a-decade activity. On the statutory
side, the same is true. While the federal government currently regulates several aspects of the redistricting process,149 it does not directly
regulate redistricting timing, and nothing in existing federal regulations is likely to be construed as preempting or prohibiting state
efforts to bar interim redistricting. As things stand, therefore, states
are free to impose a temporal floor on redistricting.
A small number of states have already exercised their authority
to impose a temporal floor, limiting state legislative or congressional
redistricting to a once-a-decade process.150 These states differ, however, in the form and degree of regulation they impose. First, states
differ about the legislative districts to which the limitation applies.
Some states limit the frequency of redistricting only with respect to
state legislative districts,151 while others do so with respect to both
147

Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 34–42.
See, e.g., Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 33–35 (1993); Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1,
27 (1975). Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 224, 226 (2003), represents the most recent example
of the Court’s assumption that districting regulations are within the ambit of Article I,
Section 4. That case concerned the meaning of a federal statute that regulated certain
aspects of congressional redistricting. While the Court split several ways over how to interpret the statute, no member of the Court questioned the federal government’s authority
under Article I, Section 4 to pass redistricting rules. Given that states’ initial authority
under that section is identical in scope to Congress’s supervisory authority, Branch reinforces the conclusion that states have initial authority to control congressional redistricting.
149 See infra Part III.B.
150 See infra notes 151–152.
151 Ten states appear to have constitutional provisions that explicitly prohibit interim
revision of their state legislative districts, see ALA. CONST. art. IX, §§ 198, 200; CONN.
CONST. art. III, § 6; HAW. CONST. art. IV, §§ 1, 2; MASS. CONST. amend. art. CI, § 2; MONT.
CONST. art. V, § 14; N.M. CONST. art. IV, § 3; N.C. CONST. art. II, §§ 3, 5; OHIO CONST. art.
XI, §§ 1, 6; PA. CONST. art. II, § 17, and at least three states appear to have statutory
provisions that do the same, see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 805 (2003); TENN. CODE ANN.
§§ 3-1-102, -103 (2003); WASH. REV. CODE § 44.05.030 (2004). In addition to prohibiting
interim redistricting, four of these states – Arizona, Hawaii, Montana, and Pennsylvania –
vest redistricting authority exclusively in redistricting commissions. See ARIZ. CONST. art.
148
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state legislative and federal congressional districts.152 Second, states
differ in the legal source of the temporal floor: The limitation is constitutional in some states but statutory in others.153 Beyond these
important distinctions, states also differ in how clearly they impose a
temporal floor on redistricting. Some states do so explicitly.
Alabama, for example, provides that:
[t]he members of the house of representatives shall be apportioned
by the legislature among the several counties of the state . . . which
apportionment, when made, shall not be subject to alteration until
the next session of the legislature after the next decennial census of
the United States shall have been taken.154

For other states, however, the existing statutory and constitutional
framework is less clear.155
While a handful of states do prohibit the redrawing of state legislative or congressional districts more than once each decade, existing
state practices highlight a few reasons why states may be less effective
than one would hope at restricting the frequency of redistricting.
First, some states that prohibit interim redistricting do so by statute
rather than through constitutional prohibition. In such states, there
are no restrictions prohibiting the state government from repealing
the frequency limitation through the ordinary legislative process.
These statutory limits, therefore, do not constitute legislative precomIV, pt. 2, § 1; HAW. CONST. art. IV, §§ 1, 2; MONT. CONST. art. V, § 14; PA. CONST. art. II,
§ 17.
152 Four states appear to have constitutional provisions expressly prohibiting interim
revision of federal congressional districts, see ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1; CONN.
CONST. art. III, § 6; HAW. CONST. art. IV, §§ 1, 2; MONT. CONST. art. V, § 14, and at least
two states have statutory provisions that do the same, see TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-16-102
(2003); WASH. REV. CODE § 44.05.030 (2004). Each of these six states also prohibits the
mid-decade revision of state legislative districts. See supra note 151.
153 See supra notes 151–152.
154 ALA. CONST. art. IX, § 198; see also CONN. CONST. art. III, § 6 (“The assembly and
senatorial districts and congressional districts as now established by law shall continue until
the regular session of the general assembly next after the completion of the taking of the
next census of the United States.”).
155 Colorado presents one particularly relevant example. Article V, Section 44 of the
Colorado constitution provides that “[w]hen a new apportionment shall be made by
Congress, the general assembly shall divide the state into congressional districts accordingly.” COLO. CONST. art. V, § 44. While this provision does not expressly limit the frequency of redistricting, the state supreme court recently held that the state constitution
does implicitly prohibit interim redistricting. People ex rel. Salazar v. Davidson, 79 P.3d
1221, 1237–40 (Colo. 2003), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Colo. Gen. Assembly v.
Salazar, 72 U.S.L.W. 3506 (U.S. Jan. 28, 2004) (No. 03-1082). California presents a historical example. In 1983, a ballot proposition was introduced in California to redraw the
state’s congressional districts. A state court ruled that the state constitution prohibited
redistricting more than once each census cycle, despite the fact that the constitution contained no express textual prohibition. See Legislature v. Deukmejian, 669 P.2d 17, 24–25
(Cal. 1983) (en banc).

R
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mitments in a formal sense, because they do not bind the action of the
legislature in the future.156 It is true, of course, that such laws still
may effectively prevent future legislatures from undertaking more frequent redistricting by increasing the legislative effort required to
accomplish off-cycle redistricting.157 Moreover, it may be that a state
legislature could formally entrench a statutory temporal floor by
prohibiting its repeal by ordinary legislation— though most courts
today appear to presume that such legislative entrenchment is prohibited.158 Despite these possibilities, the existing statutory regulations
may not be particularly effective at limiting the frequency of
redistricting.159
Moreover, states that impose a temporal floor on state legislative
districting seldom prohibit off-cycle redistricting with respect to federal congressional districts. This is unsurprising, given the fact that
states do not regulate congressional districting to the extent that they
regulate state redistricting.160 The reasons for the differing degrees of
regulation are not entirely clear. It may be that the state legislature’s
conflict of interest seems more immediate in the state redistricting
context and that this perceived conflict leads to more pervasive regulation. (The history of redistricting practices, however, belies the contention that party-centered self-dealing disappears when this formal
conflict is removed.) It may also be that congressional redistricting
receives less attention because it is not intimately connected to the
structure and functioning of the state government: The rules regu156 See Issacharoff, Judging Politics, supra note 17, at 1665–66. For a more theoretical
discussion of precommitment strategies, see JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS:
STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND IRRATIONALITY (1979).
157 See generally ELSTER, supra note 156, at 39 (defining precommitments to include
actions that make more difficult particular future action but do not preclude possibility of
that action); Issacharoff, Judging Politics, supra note 17, at 1665–66 (describing precommitments as “the creation of prearranged impediments that retard rather than preclude the
capacity to alter a preconceived plan”).
158 See, e.g., United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 872 (1996). For competing
arguments about the validity of the anti-entrenchment principle, compare Eric A. Posner
& Adrian Vermeule, Legislative Entrenchment: A Reappraisal, 111 YALE L.J. 1665 (2002),
with John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Symmetric Entrenchment: A
Constitutional and Normative Theory, 89 VA. L. REV. 385 (2003), and Stewart E. Sterk,
Retrenchment and Entrenchment, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 231 (2003).
159 Texas provides an example of the potentially weak disciplinary effect of rules that
the legislature may overturn. The Texas Senate has historically abided by an informal
agreement that a two-thirds vote of the members is necessary to take up legislation. In the
recent redistricting fight, however, the president of the Senate, Lieutenant Governor
David Dewhurst, suspended the two-thirds rule. See Session v. Perry, 298 F. Supp. 2d 451,
458 (E.D. Tex. 2004), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Mar. 31, 2004) (No. 03-9644).
160 For example, a number of states that have transferred the authority to redraw state
legislative districts to bipartisan or nonpartisan commissions have not done so for congressional districts. See Persily, supra note 49, at 681–83.
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lating state redistricting efforts frequently are found in sections of the
state constitution or code that are devoted to the details of the state
legislative institutions, suggesting that these institutions, and the rules
that govern them, simply have greater salience for state governments.
Regardless of the reasons for states’ relative inattention to the
problems of congressional districting, the fact remains that states are
less likely to limit the frequency of congressional redistricting.
B. Congress
Like the states, Congress clearly has authority to prohibit the
revision of congressional districts more than once a decade. The
Elections Clause grants Congress supervisory authority to “make or
alter” regulations governing the time, place, and manner of congressional elections.161 The federal government has used this authority to
regulate congressional redistricting since 1842, when Congress passed
a law requiring that states elect members of the House of
Representatives from districts, rather than from the state at large.162
Today, Congress regulates several aspects of congressional districting,
imposing a general requirement of districted congressional elections
and elaborating the circumstances under which at-large elections are
permissible.163 Courts have never questioned that these regulations
constitute a valid exercise of Congress’s authority under Article I,
Section 4.164
Although Congress has clear constitutional authority to regulate
the timing of congressional redistricting, its authority to regulate this
aspect of state legislative districting is less certain. Article I grants
Congress regulatory authority only with respect to congressional elections. Accordingly, Congress would have to look to another constitutional source of congressional authority in order to regulate
161 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4; cf. supra text accompanying notes 145–148 (noting that
Article I, Section 4 grants states initial authority to enact such regulations).
162 See Act of June 25, 1842, § 2, 5 Stat. 491 (corresponds to 2 U.S.C. §§ 2a–2c (2000));
see also Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 42 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (noting that
Congress first exercised its authority to regulate congressional elections in Act of June 25).
The requirement was later dropped, reinstated, and modified, at one time including a
requirement that congressional districts be equipopulous. Id. at 42–43.
163 See 2 U.S.C. §§ 2a–2c (2000). In fact, the plaintiffs in the Texas litigation argued that
§ 2c implicitly prohibits redistricting more than once each decennial cycle. See Session, 298
F. Supp. 2d at 464 (“Plaintiffs assert that . . . [f]irst, in § 2c Congress revoked the power
granted to state legislatures by the Elections Clause and delegated a far more limited
power. Second, they urge that § 2c allows redistricting once after the decennial census. As
a result, they urge that when Balderas [redistricted the state following the 2000 census], the
judgment effectively ‘used up’ the redistricting power delegated to the states through
§ 2c.”) (alteration in original). The court rejected this contention. See id. at 464–66.
164 See Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 266–70 (2003); supra note 148.
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nonfederal redistricting. The most plausible source of such authority
is Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Section 5 grants Congress
authority to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. In
1965, Congress invoked its Section 5 authority to enact the Voting
Rights Act,165 the most prominent and comprehensive instance of federal regulation of state election practices (including redistricting).166
The Supreme Court subsequently upheld several provisions of the Act
as valid exercises of Congress’s Section 5 authority—even though the
Court had previously concluded that the state practices regulated by
those provisions did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment.167
Although the Court’s conception of Section 5 power in those decisions
is somewhat unclear, the Court appeared willing to defer to
Congress’s judgment about the necessity of broad prophylactic measures to protect the rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment.168
More recently, however, the Court has dramatically restricted
Congress’s Section 5 power. In City of Boerne v. Flores 169 and its
progeny, the Court held that Congress may enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment only as the Supreme Court itself has interpreted it.170 In
addition, the Court held that Section 5 legislation is permissible only
to the extent that there is “congruence and proportionality” between
the statute’s enforcement mechanisms and the Court-defined violations of the Fourteenth Amendment that the statute seeks to pre165 Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1973–1973p (2000).
166 See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 315–16 (1966) (describing “complex
scheme of stringent remedies” provided by Act). The Voting Rights Act is also an exercise
of Congress’s power to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment. See id. at 324–27, 337.
167 Compare Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 118 (1970) (upholding provision of
Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970 that imposed five-year ban on literacy requirements for voters) and Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 643–47 (1966) (holding that
Section 5 of Fourteenth Amendment conferred power on Congress to enact section 4(e) of
Voting Rights Act, which prohibited enforcement in some circumstances of New York law
requiring English literacy as condition of voting), with Lassiter v. Northhampton County
Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 50–54 (1959) (holding that North Carolina’s English literacy
requirement for voters did not violate Fourteenth or Seventeenth Amendment). Relatedly, the Court upheld some provisions as appropriate exercises of Congress’s analogous
power to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment. See City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S.
156, 173–78 (1980); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 327–37.
168 Cf. Karlan, supra note 37, at 255 (“Mitchell and Gingles effectively overruled, on
statutory grounds, the Court’s [prior] constitutional rulings regarding participation and
aggregation rights.”).
169 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
170 See id. at 518–19, 527 (“Any suggestion that Congress has a substantive, non-remedial power under the Fourteenth Amendment is not supported by our case law.”); see also
Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 365 (2001); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S.
62, 81 (2000).
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vent.171 While the precise content of this standard is uncertain and
subject to extended debate,172 it is clear that the doctrine accords little
deference to Congress’s legislative judgments. Accordingly, the constitutionality of Section 5 legislation turns much more today on the
Court’s judgment about the unconstitutionality of existing state conduct than on Congress’s judgment about the extent to which federal
legislation will help secure constitutional rights.
C. The Federal Courts
If states may be unlikely to regulate congressional districting
timing, and Congress’s capacity to prohibit the interim revision of
state legislative districts turns principally on how federal courts view
that practice, then one must ask how those courts should evaluate
instances of off-cycle redistricting. Could federal courts plausibly prohibit interim redistricting on constitutional grounds?
No provisions of the federal Constitution appear to be directly
concerned with the timing of either congressional or state legislative
redistricting.173 Any attempt to locate a clear constitutional norm
against interim redistricting is therefore likely to fail. Nonetheless,
the Court’s partisan gerrymandering jurisprudence may provide some
support for a constitutional rule prohibiting interim redistricting.
Since Davis v. Bandemer, partisan gerrymandering claims have been
171

Id. at 520.
For description and criticism of the Court’s current interpretation of Section 5, see
Evan H. Caminker, “Appropriate” Means-Ends Constraints on Section 5 Powers, 53 STAN.
L. REV. 1127 (2001).
173 In the legal challenges to Texas’s recent interim redistricting, the plaintiffs argued
that both Article I, Section 4 (the Elections Clause) and Article I, Section 2, Clause 3 (the
Census Clause) of the Constitution implicitly prohibit the interim redistricting of congressional districts. See Session v. Perry, 298 F. Supp. 2d 451, 458, 461–62 (E.D. Tex. 2004),
petition for cert. filed (U.S. Mar. 31, 2004) (No. 03-9644). As I explained above, the Elections Clause delegates to states initial authority to develop procedures governing congressional elections. See supra Part III.A. It provides: “The Times, Places and Manner of
holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by
the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such
Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4 (emphasis
added). The Texas plaintiffs argued that, because the clause provides that Congress can
make laws regulating elections “at any time,” states cannot—and specifically, that the
restriction somehow limits states to drawing congressional districts only once each decade,
immediately after the release of the census. Session, 298 F. Supp. 2d at 459. As the threejudge panel explained, this argument is quite a stretch as a matter of constitutional interpretation. Id. at 459–61. The Census Clause argument has similar shortcomings. The
plaintiffs argued that the Census Clause, by requiring that Representatives be apportioned
“according to their respective numbers” and then providing for an enumeration every 10
years, somehow limited states to redistricting once each decade. Id. at 461–62. The court
concluded that this argument also is in considerable tension with constitutional text, history, and existing jurisprudence. Id. at 462–63.
172
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cognizable under the Equal Protection Clause.174 The Court has
made clear, therefore, that partisan fairness in one form or another is
of constitutional concern. And as the discussion in Part II demonstrates, prohibiting interim redistricting will promote partisan fairness.
One possibility, therefore, is that a rule prohibiting interim redistricting might be explained or justified as part of the Court’s anti-partisan gerrymandering jurisprudence. Whether such an explanation or
justification is possible turns in part on the precise nature of the constitutional norms at stake in that jurisprudence. But it does not turn
solely on the context of constitutional norms; it hinges also on an
understanding of courts’ institutional capacities to enforce those
norms.175
Davis v. Bandemer leaves considerable uncertainty on both of
these fronts. In that case, in which Indiana Democrats challenged the
state legislative districts that were drawn by the Republican-controlled legislature on the ground that the districts constituted an
unconstitutional partisan gerrymander, a majority of the Court held
that such claims are justiciable under the Equal Protection Clause.176
Beyond the issue of justiciability, however, the Court agreed on little.
The plurality and concurring opinions reveal deep disagreements
about what constitutional norms partisan gerrymanders might violate,
as well as about how the Court should develop a doctrine to test for
the existence of gerrymanders that violate those constitutional
norms.177 Even within the individual opinions there is considerable
ambiguity and ambivalence about these matters. In fact, most members of the Bandemer Court are far clearer about what elements
should not be a part of any partisan gerrymandering jurisprudence
than about what elements should be a part. Several members of the
Court, for example, were deeply concerned about the possibility of
reading into the Equal Protection Clause any norm that entailed some
sort of commitment to proportional representation.178 A number of
Justices also emphasized that the Constitution should not be inter174

478 U.S. 109, 113 (1986).
See infra text accompanying notes 192–194.
176 See Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 124–25, 143.
177 On the merits, the Court split three ways. Justice White’s plurality opinion concluded that the plaintiffs had not made a sufficient showing of unconstitutionality. Id. at
113, 127–43 (White, J., joined by Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.). Justice Powell
disagreed, concluding that the plaintiffs had proven the existence of an unconstitutional
partisan gerrymander. Id. at 161–85 (Powell, J., joined by Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). Justice O’Connor’s opinion did not reach the merits because she
concluded that the case should be held nonjusticiable. Id. at 144–161 (O’Connor, J., joined
by Rehnquist, J. and Burger, C.J., concurring in judgment).
178 See id. at 130, 132 (plurality opinion); id. at 145, 147, 155–59 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment); id. at 169 n.7 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
175

R

\\server05\productn\N\NYU\79-3\NYU301.txt

798

unknown

Seq: 48

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

1-JUL-04

9:31

[Vol. 79:751

preted in a fashion that called into question the constitutionality of
districted elections.179 Relatedly, a majority of Justices were
extremely attentive to the difficulty of developing a rule for identifying unconstitutional partisan gerrymanders that would not be wholly
indeterminate and, at the same time, that would not indirectly
advance some value—such as proportional representation—that these
Justices believed was not entailed by a proper interpretation of the
Constitution.180
The result of this uncertainty is that neither the plurality
opinion’s test for unconstitutional gerrymanders (which essentially
requires plaintiffs to demonstrate that they have been “shut out” of
the political process181) nor the various opinions’ discussions of the
Equal Protection Clause identifies coherently the relevant constitutional norms or provides guidance about the extent to which the doctrine is driven by institutional concerns.182 Nor have subsequent
partisan gerrymandering cases in the lower courts clarified matters.
Because the evidentiary hurdle adopted by the Bandemer plurality
has proved in practice to be an insurmountable one, no postBandemer court has struck down a districting scheme as an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander.183 The uniform, and typically summary, rejection of partisan gerrymandering claims by lower courts has
prevented the case-by-case development of a fuller understanding of
the constitutional norms at stake in such cases. In addition, the status
of constitutional law concerning partisan gerrymandering is all the
more uncertain at present because the Supreme Court is reconsidering
its partisan gerrymandering jurisprudence this Term for the first time
since Bandemer, having recently heard argument in a case concerning
whether Pennsylvania’s new congressional districts constitute an
unconstitutional partisan gerrymander.184
Despite the considerable uncertainty in contemporary partisan
gerrymandering jurisprudence, there are some important connections
between the values promoted by a rule prohibiting interim redis179 See id. at 130 (plurality opinion); id. at 159–60 (O’Connor, J., concurring in
judgment).
180 See id. at 133 (plurality opinion); id. at 145, 147–48, 155–57 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
181 See id. at 139 (plurality opinion).
182 See id. at 139–43 (plurality opinion); id. at 153–55 (O’Connor, J., concurring in
judgment).
183 Cf. ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 40, at 866 (describing Republican Party of N.C.
v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943 (4th Cir. 1992), as only case since Bandemer in which court has
found that plaintiff stated valid partisan gerrymandering cause of action).
184 Vieth v. Pennsylvania, 241 F. Supp. 2d 478, 484–85 (M.D. Pa. 2003) (incorporating
partisan gerrymandering holding from Vieth v. Pennsylvania, 188 F. Supp. 2d 532, 539–40
(M.D. Pa. 2002)), prob. juris. noted sub nom., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 123 S. Ct. 2652 (2003).
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tricting and the values and concerns that make brief appearances in
Bandemer. As the discussion in Part II demonstrates, a rule prohibiting interim redistricting would curtail the power of partisan gerrymanders by lowering system-wide levels of partisan bias and,
importantly, by lessening the likelihood of partisan lock-up of the
political process—one of the specific concerns animating both the plurality opinion in Bandemer and Justice O’Connor’s concurrence.185
Moreover, it would do so without reading into the Equal Protection
Clause two values that a majority of the Justices in Bandemer clearly
disavowed: a preference for proportional representation and a hostility toward districted elections. In theory, partisan fairness can be
conceptualized in ways that do not entail a commitment to either of
these values, and in practice a rule prohibiting mid-decade redistricting is perfectly consistent with the existing institutional framework of winner-take-all districted elections.
Perhaps as important, a rule prohibiting mid-decade redistricting
appears consistent with the Court’s conception of its institutional limitations in partisan gerrymandering cases. In Bandemer, the Justices
joining the plurality opinion were clearly concerned about the Court’s
ability to accurately identify unconstitutional partisan gerrymanders.186 Relatedly, they were obviously worried about the Court’s
ability to craft a partisan gerrymandering doctrine that would not be
hopelessly uncertain and difficult to administer.187 In practice, both of
these concerns seem well founded. Judicial efforts to identify partisan
gerrymanders after the fact have been a miserable failure in the postBandemer world. The Court’s inability to craft a workable evidentiary
standard in Bandemer has left the prohibition against partisan gerrymandering essentially unenforceable,188 and several Justices of the
Court suggested in the Vieth oral argument that the Court is simply
incapable of developing standards to measure unconstitutional partisan gerrymanders after the fact.189 At the same time, however, the

185 See, e.g., Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 135–36 (plurality opinion); id. at 152
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (suggesting that one reason judicial intervention was unwarranted was that “there is good reason to think that political gerrymandering is a self-limiting enterprise”).
186 See id. at 133 (plurality opinion); id. at 145, 147–48, 155–57 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
187 See id. at 133 (plurality opinion); id. at 145, 147–48, 155–57 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
188 See supra note 183.
189 See Oral Argument at 22–24, Vieth v. Jubelirer, 124 S. Ct. 595 (2003) (No. 02-1580)
(statements of unidentified Justices).
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uncertain content of the standard set forth in Bandemer provides a
ready vehicle for litigation.190
In contrast, a rule prohibiting (or presuming the unconstitutionality of) interim redistricting does not share such stark evidentiary and
administrative shortcomings. It does not require the Court to make
difficult empirical judgments about the political fairness of particular
districting arrangements. And like the complementary decennial
redistricting requirement, which is often lauded for its administrability
(if for little else),191 a temporal floor is straightforward to enforce. Its
easy administrability would leave little room for judicial discretion,
eliminating the concern of some that judicial discretion in political
process cases increases opportunities for both partisan adjudication
and partisan capture of the litigation process. Moreover, the simple
structure of a prohibition against off-cycle redistricting might well
lower levels of litigation by delineating cleanly the boundaries of
acceptable redistricting timetables.
In light of the relevant institutional capacities and propensities, a
constitutional doctrine prohibiting mid-decade redistricting might
represent one sensible way of promoting the constitutional values at
stake in partisan gerrymandering cases. It is true, of course, that the
prohibition on mid-decade redistricting is “prophylactic” in that it
rests in part on institutional judgments about the ability of courts to
enforce constitutional norms and does not turn only on a “true” interpretation of those norms.192 But as David Strauss and others have
pointed out, constitutional doctrine is not rendered illegitimate by
virtue of its being prophylactic in this sense.193 As a matter of current
constitutional law, prophylactic rules are pervasive: Many constitutional doctrines are at least partly the product of judicial efforts to
craft workable rules that promote the relevant constitutional values in
the institutional context of constitutional adjudication, rather than
being simply entailed by a “true” interpretation of the relevant consti190

See id. at 3–4.
See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW 121 (1980).
192 See David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 190,
190–95 (1988) (defining prophylactic rules in this way). Relatedly, the rule is “prophylactic” in the sense that it might prohibit some instances of redistricting that do not violate
the constitutional norm at issue and permit some instances that do violate the constitutional norm. Cf. Evan H. Caminker, Miranda and Some Puzzles of “Prophylactic” Rules,
70 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 1 n.2, 25 (2001) (setting out several possible definitions of prophylactic rules).
193 See Strauss, supra note 192, at 195; see also David A. Strauss, Miranda, The
Constitution, and Congress, 99 MICH. L. REV. 958, 963 (2001) (explaining that Constitution
often “does not ordain any particular institutional mechanism” for ensuring adherence to
relevant constitutional norm).
191
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tutional provisions.194 In fact, prophylactic rules are part and parcel
of the existing constitutional doctrine regulating the timing of redistricting.195 In Reynolds v. Sims,196 the Court established a temporal
ceiling on the redistricting process by holding that a state’s failure to
redistrict at least once each decade would render its districts “constitutionally suspect.”197 This presumption of unconstitutionality, which
gradually evolved into a rule requiring redistricting following each
census,198 was expressly justified by the Court on the respective institutional capacities of legislatures and courts to promote the constitutional value of maintaining equipopulous districts.199 Accordingly, the
prophylactic nature of a judicial prohibition on interim redistricting
would not be foreign to existing redistricting regulations.200
In light of the uncertainty surrounding the Court’s partisan gerrymandering jurisprudence, the foregoing discussion is necessarily
somewhat provisional. The discussion does make clear, however, that
the fact that the Constitution does not appear to be specifically concerned with the timing of redistricting is not itself sufficient to render
194 See, e.g., Caminker, supra note 192, at 25–26. The structure of existing constitutional
law underscores a more fundamental point: There is no meaningful distinction between
“prophylactic” rules and “ordinary” constitutional rules in the sense that many constitutional rules that are considered “ordinary” are in fact prophylactic. Id.
195 Moreover, in related contexts scholars have recently suggested that the Court either
has used or should use prophylactic rules to regulate certain aspects of the redistricting
process. See Issacharoff, Political Cartels, supra note 17, at 641–48 (arguing that Court
should prophylactically invalidate all district maps drawn by partisan actors); Melissa L.
Saunders, Reconsidering Shaw: The Miranda of Race-Conscious Redistricting, 109 YALE
L.J. 1603 (2000) (arguing that Shaw doctrine is best understood as prophylactic rule).
196 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
197 Id. at 583–84.
198 See supra note 36.
199 See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 583–84.
200 Moreover, the prophylactic nature of a judicial prohibition on redistricting undermines the concern that such a rule would forever fix the temporal cycle of the redistricting
process as a matter of federal constitutional law, preventing future redistricting reforms
that might be inconsistent with this constitutional rule. A judicial prohibition, even a constitutional one, would not necessarily prevent states or Congress from enacting other
mechanisms to promote partisan fairness, even if those mechanisms permitted or even
required redistricting more than once each decennial cycle. Suppose, for example, that
Congress decided to police interim redistricting for partisan unfairness by implementing a
pre-clearance procedure similar to that under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act for all
instances of interim redistricting. The procedure might require states that wanted to
redraw their districts outside of the decennial census cycle to seek a declaratory judgment
from the D.C. Circuit that the plan was not designed largely as a partisan gerrymander.
Nothing would prevent the Court from concluding that this mechanism was an effective
substitute for its rule prohibiting all interim redistrictings, and that the judicial rule therefore was no longer warranted. Reaching such a conclusion would not require the Court to
reject its earlier interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause. Rather, it would require
only that the Court adjust its doctrine to reflect institutional changes to the redistricting
process. See Caminker, supra note 192, at 22–25.
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a rule prohibiting interim redistricting unjustifiable as a matter of constitutional law.
CONCLUSION
Shifting political norms have undermined the conventional
assumption that redistricting is a once-a-decade activity. There is
reason to be concerned about this change: Redistricting outside the
decennial census cycle is likely to occur under conditions favoring partisan gerrymandering, and the ability to revise district maps
throughout a decade makes it easier for a party in control of the redistricting process to lock-up the political process to its own advantage.
A limitation on the frequency of redistricting can prevent these
potential ill effects. By amplifying the uncertainty inherent in the gerrymandering calculus, and by partially randomizing control over the
redistricting process, such a limitation can promote lower levels of
partisan bias. More generally, the beneficial effects of this processbased redistricting regulation highlight the need for more careful
attention to the consequences of other process-based regulations on
the political fairness of districted elections.
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